مقدمه قانون اساسی ایالات متحده

مقدمه قانون اساسی ایالات متحده یا مدخل قانون اساسی ایلات متحده که با کلمات "ما مردم" (انگلیسی: We the People) شروع می‌شود، بیانیه مقدماتی مختصری از اهداف اساسی قانون اساسی ایالات متحده و اصول راهنما است. دادگاه‌ها از آن به عنوان مدرک قابل اعتمادی از نیات پدران بنیانگذار در مورد معنای قانون اساسی و آنچه آنها امیدوار بودند قانون اساسی به آن دست یابد، یاد کرده‌اند.

مقدمه عمدتاً توسط گاورنور موریس، نماینده پنسیلوانیا در کنوانسیون قانون اساسی آمریکا در سال ۱۷۸۷ که در سالن استقلال در فیلادلفیا برگزار شد، نوشته شده‌است.

ما مردم ایالات متحده، به منظور تشکیل اتحادیه‌ای کامل‌تر، استقرار عدالت، تأمین آسایش ملی، تضمین دفاع مشترک، ارتقای رفاه عمومی و حفظ برکات آزادی برای خود و آیندگانمان، قانون اساسی حاضر را برای ایالات متحده آمریکا وضع و مقرر می‌نماییم.

تدوین[ویرایش]

این مقدمه در آخرین روزهای کنوانسیون قانون اساسی آمریکا توسط کمیته سبک در قانون اساسی قرار گرفت که پیش نویس نهایی خود را نوشت و گاورنر موریس این تلاش را رهبری کرد. قبلاً در صحن کنوانسیون پیشنهاد یا مورد بحث قرار نگرفت. متن اولیه مقدمه به مردم ایالات متحده اشاره نمی‌کرد. بلکه به مردم ایالت‌های مختلف اشاره می‌کرد که معمول بود.

در اسناد قبلی، از جمله معاهده اتحاد با فرانسه در سال ۱۷۷۸، مواد کنفدراسیون، و معاهده ۱۷۸۳ پاریس که استقلال آمریکا را به رسمیت می‌شناخت، از کلمه «مردم» استفاده نشده بود و عبارت ایالات متحده بلافاصله با فهرستی از آنها همراه شد. ایالت‌ها، از شمال به جنوب.^[۱] این تغییر به دلیل ضرورت انجام شد، زیرا قانون اساسی مقرر می‌داشت که هر زمان که کنوانسیون‌های تصویب کننده منتخب مردم نه ایالت تأیید خود را صادر کردند، صرف نظر از اینکه آیا هیچ‌یک از ایالت‌های باقیمانده آن را تصویب کرده‌اند یا خیر، این تغییر برای آن ۹ ایالت اجرا می‌شود.^[۲]

معنی و کاربرد[ویرایش]

مقدمه صرفاً به عنوان مقدمه عمل می‌کند و اختیاراتی را به دولت فدرال اختصاص نمی‌دهد،^[۳] و همچنین محدودیت‌های خاصی را برای اقدامات دولت ارائه نمی‌کند. به دلیل ماهیت محدود مقدمه، هیچ دادگاهی هرگز از آن به عنوان عامل تعیین‌کننده در قضاوت پرونده استفاده نکرده‌است،^[۴] مگر در مورد دعوای بیهوده.^[۵]

ارتباط قضایی[ویرایش]

دادگاه‌ها به هر سرنخی که در مقدمه در مورد معنای قانون اساسی می‌توانند بیابند، علاقه نشان داده‌اند.^[۶] دادگاه‌ها تکنیک‌های متعددی را برای تفسیر معنای قوانین ایجاد کرده‌اند و از آنها برای تفسیر قانون اساسی نیز استفاده می‌شود.^[۷] در نتیجه دادگاه‌ها گفته‌اند که در تفسیر مفهوم قانون اساسی باید از فنون تفسیری که بر متن دقیق سند^[۸] تمرکز دارد استفاده شود. در مقابل این تکنیک‌ها، تکنیک‌هایی متوازن هستند که توجه بیشتری را بر تلاش‌های گسترده‌تر برای تشخیص معنای سند از چیزی بیش از فقط عبارت متمرکز می‌کنند.^[۹] مقدمه برای این تلاش‌ها برای شناسایی «روح» قانون اساسی نیز مفید است.

ماهیت مردمی قانون اساسی[ویرایش]

قانون اساسی ادعا می‌کند که عمل با «ما مردم» است. با این حال، از آنجایی که نشان دهنده یک قرارداد اجتماعی عمومی است، محدودیت‌هایی برای توانایی شهروندان برای پیگیری دعاوی حقوقی که ادعا می‌شود ناشی از قانون اساسی است، وجود دارد. به عنوان مثال، اگر قانونی تصویب می‌شد که قانون اساسی را نقض می‌کرد، هیچ‌کس نمی‌توانست قانون اساسی این قانون را در دادگاه به چالش بکشد. در عوض، تنها فردی که تحت تأثیر قانون مغایر قانون اساسی قرار گرفته باشد، می‌تواند چنین چالشی را مطرح کند.^[۱۰] به عنوان مثال، شخصی که مدعی مزایای خاصی است که توسط یک قانون ایجاد شده‌است، نمی‌تواند به دلایل قانون اساسی، مکانیسم اداری را که به آنها اعطا می‌کند به چالش بکشد.^[۱۱] همین اصول در مورد نهادهای شرکتی اعمال می‌شود،^[۱۲] و می‌توانند دکترین فرسودگی راه‌حل‌ها را دخیل کنند.^[۱۳]

جستارهای وابسته[ویرایش]

منابع[ویرایش]

↑ McDonald, Forrest. "Essay on the Preamble". The Heritage Foundation. Retrieved July 13, 2014.
↑ Schütze, Robert. European Constitutional Law, p. 50 (Cambridge University Press 2012).
↑ See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 22 (1905) ("Although th[e] preamble indicates the general purposes for which the people ordained and established the Constitution, it has never been regarded as the source of any substantive power conferred on the government of the United States, or on any of its departments."); see also United States v. Boyer, 85 F. 425, 430–31 (W.D. Mo. 1898) ("The preamble never can be resorted to, to enlarge the powers confided to the general government, or any of its departments. It cannot confer any power per se. It can never amount, by implication, to an enlargement of any power expressly given. It can never be the legitimate source of any implied power, when otherwise withdrawn from the constitution. Its true office is to expound the nature and extent and application of the powers actually conferred by the constitution, and not substantively to create them." (quoting 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 462 (1833)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
↑ It is difficult to prove a negative, but courts have at times acknowledged this apparent truism. See, e.g., Boyer, 85 F. at 430 ("I venture the opinion that no adjudicated case can be cited which traces to the preamble the power to enact any statute.").
↑ In Jacobs v. Pataki, 68 F. App'x 222, 224 (2d Cir. 2003), the plaintiff made the bizarre argument that "the 'United States of America' that was granted Article III power in the Constitution is distinct from the 'United States' that currently exercises that power"; the court dismissed this contention with 3 words ("it is not") and cited a comparison of the Preamble's reference to the "United States of America" with Article III's vesting of the "judicial Power of the United States."
↑ Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 531–32 (1871) ("[I]t [cannot] be questioned that, when investigating the nature and extent of the powers, conferred by the Constitution upon Congress, it is indispensable to keep in view the objects for which those powers were granted. This is a universal rule of construction applied alike to statutes, wills, contracts, and constitutions. If the general purpose of the instrument is ascertained, the language of its provisions must be construed with reference to that purpose and so as to subserve it. In no other way can the intent of the framers of the instrument be discovered. And there are more urgent reasons for looking to the ultimate purpose in examining the powers conferred by a constitution than there are in construing a statute, a will, or a contract. We do not expect to find in a constitution minute details. It is necessarily brief and comprehensive. It prescribes outlines, leaving the filling up to be deduced from the outlines."), abrogated on other grounds by Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), as recognized in Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
↑ Cf. Badger v. Hoidale, 88 F.2d 208, 211 (8th Cir. 1937) ("Rules applicable to the construction of a statute are equally applicable to the construction of a Constitution." (citing Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Minn. 107 (1865))).
↑ Examples include the "plain meaning rule," Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 619 (1895) ("The words of the Constitution are to be taken in their obvious sense, and to have a reasonable construction."), superseded on other grounds by U.S. CONST. amend. XVI, as recognized in Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1 (1916); McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27 (1892) ("The framers of the Constitution employed words in their natural sense; and where they are plain and clear, resort to collateral aids to interpretation is unnecessary and cannot be indulged in to narrow or enlarge the text ...."), and noscitur a sociis, Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893) ("It is a familiar rule in the construction of terms to apply to them the meaning naturally attaching to them from their context. Noscitur a sociis is a rule of construction applicable to all written instruments. Where any particular word is obscure or of doubtful meaning, taken by itself, its obscurity or doubt may be removed by reference to associated words. And the meaning of a term may be enlarged or restrained by reference to the object of the whole clause in which it is used.").
↑ See, e.g., Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 663 (1945) ("[I]n determining the meaning and application of [a] constitutional provision, we are concerned with matters of substance, not of form."), overruled on other grounds by Limbach v. Hooven & Allison Co., 466 U.S. 353 (1984); South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 451 (1905) ("[I]t is undoubtedly true that that which is implied is as much a part of the Constitution as that which is expressed."), overruled on other grounds by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 658 (1884) ("[I]n construing the Constitution of the United States, [courts use] the doctrine universally applied to all instruments of writing, that what is implied is as much a part of the instrument as what is expressed. This principle, in its application to the Constitution of the United States, more than to almost any other writing, is a necessity, by reason of the inherent inability to put into words all derivative powers ...."); Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U.S. 80, 87 (1877) ("A mere adherence to the letter [of the Constitution], without reference to the spirit and purpose, may [sometimes] mislead.").
↑ Ala. State Fed'n of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 463 (1945) ("Only those to whom a statute applies and who are adversely affected by it can draw in question its constitutional validity in a declaratory judgment proceeding as in any other."); Premier-Pabst Sales Co. v. Grosscup, 298 U.S. 226, 227 (1936) ("One who would strike down a state statute as obnoxious to the Federal Constitution must show that the alleged unconstitutional feature injures him."); Buscaglia v. Fiddler, 157 F.2d 579, 581 (1st Cir. 1946) ("It is a settled principle of law that no court will consider the constitutionality of a statute unless the record before it affords an adequate factual basis for determining whether the challenged statute applies to and adversely affects the one who draws it in question."); Liberty Nat'l Bank v. Collins, 58 N.E.2d 610, 614 (Ill. 1944) ("The rule is universal that no one can raise a question as to the constitutionality of a statute unless he is injuriously affected by the alleged unconstitutional provisions. It is an established rule in this State that one may not complain of the invalidity of a statutory provision which does not affect him. This court will not determine the constitutionality of the provisions of an act which do not affect the parties to the cause under consideration, or where the party urging the invalidity of such provisions is not in any way aggrieved by their operation." (citation omitted)).
↑ See, e.g., Ison v. W. Vegetable Distribs., 59 P.2d 649, 655 (Ariz. 1936) ("It is the general rule of law that when a party invokes the benefit of a statute, he may not, in one and the same breath, claim a right granted by it and reject the terms upon which the right is granted."); State ex rel. Sorensen v. S. Neb. Power Co., 268 N.W. 284, 285 (Neb. 1936) ("[In this case,] defendants … invoked the statute, … relied upon and t[ook] advantage of it, and are now estopped to assail the statute as unconstitutional."). It is important not to read these too broadly. For example, in In re Auditor Gen., 266 N.W. 464 (Mich. 1936), certain property had been foreclosed upon for delinquent payment of taxes. A statute changed the terms by which foreclosure sales had to be published and announced in the community. The Michigan Supreme Court held that it was not necessary to question the validity of the taxes whose nonpayment led to the foreclosure, to have standing to question the validity of the procedure by which the foreclosure sale was being conducted.
↑ E.g., Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 107 (1946) (a claim that the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 "is void in the absence of an express provision for notice and opportunity for hearing as to security holders regarding proceedings under that section [is groundless]. The short answer is that such a contention can be raised properly only by a security holder who has suffered injury due to lack of notice or opportunity for hearing. No security holder of that type is now before us. The management[] of American … admittedly w[as] notified and participated in the hearings … and … possess[es] no standing to assert the invalidity of that section from the viewpoint of the security holders' constitutional rights to notice and hearing"); Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed'n No. 40, Ry. Employees Dep't, 300 U.S. 515, 558 (1937) (under the Railway Labor Act, a "railroad can complain only of the infringement of its own constitutional immunity, not that of its employees" (citations omitted)).
↑ E.g., Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 337, 353 (1937) ("Constitutional questions are not to be decided hypothetically. When particular facts control the decision they must be shown. Petitioner's contention as to impossibility of proof is premature .... For the present purpose it is sufficient to hold, and we do hold, that the petitioner may constitutionally be required to present all the pertinent facts in the prescribed administrative proceeding and may there raise, and ultimately may present for judicial review, any legal question which may arise as the facts are developed." (citation omitted)).

پیوند به بیرون[ویرایش]

فایند لاو - مقدمه قانون اساسی

[1] McDonald, Forrest. "Essay on the Preamble". The Heritage Foundation. Retrieved July 13, 2014.

[2] Schütze, Robert. European Constitutional Law, p. 50 (Cambridge University Press 2012).

[3] See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 22 (1905) ("Although th[e] preamble indicates the general purposes for which the people ordained and established the Constitution, it has never been regarded as the source of any substantive power conferred on the government of the United States, or on any of its departments."); see also United States v. Boyer, 85 F. 425, 430–31 (W.D. Mo. 1898) ("The preamble never can be resorted to, to enlarge the powers confided to the general government, or any of its departments. It cannot confer any power per se. It can never amount, by implication, to an enlargement of any power expressly given. It can never be the legitimate source of any implied power, when otherwise withdrawn from the constitution. Its true office is to expound the nature and extent and application of the powers actually conferred by the constitution, and not substantively to create them." (quoting 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 462 (1833)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

[4] It is difficult to prove a negative, but courts have at times acknowledged this apparent truism. See, e.g., Boyer, 85 F. at 430 ("I venture the opinion that no adjudicated case can be cited which traces to the preamble the power to enact any statute.").

[5] In Jacobs v. Pataki, 68 F. App'x 222, 224 (2d Cir. 2003), the plaintiff made the bizarre argument that "the 'United States of America' that was granted Article III power in the Constitution is distinct from the 'United States' that currently exercises that power"; the court dismissed this contention with 3 words ("it is not") and cited a comparison of the Preamble's reference to the "United States of America" with Article III's vesting of the "judicial Power of the United States."

[6] Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 531–32 (1871) ("[I]t [cannot] be questioned that, when investigating the nature and extent of the powers, conferred by the Constitution upon Congress, it is indispensable to keep in view the objects for which those powers were granted. This is a universal rule of construction applied alike to statutes, wills, contracts, and constitutions. If the general purpose of the instrument is ascertained, the language of its provisions must be construed with reference to that purpose and so as to subserve it. In no other way can the intent of the framers of the instrument be discovered. And there are more urgent reasons for looking to the ultimate purpose in examining the powers conferred by a constitution than there are in construing a statute, a will, or a contract. We do not expect to find in a constitution minute details. It is necessarily brief and comprehensive. It prescribes outlines, leaving the filling up to be deduced from the outlines."), abrogated on other grounds by Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), as recognized in Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).

[7] Cf. Badger v. Hoidale, 88 F.2d 208, 211 (8th Cir. 1937) ("Rules applicable to the construction of a statute are equally applicable to the construction of a Constitution." (citing Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Minn. 107 (1865))).

[8] Examples include the "plain meaning rule," Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 619 (1895) ("The words of the Constitution are to be taken in their obvious sense, and to have a reasonable construction."), superseded on other grounds by U.S. CONST. amend. XVI, as recognized in Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1 (1916); McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27 (1892) ("The framers of the Constitution employed words in their natural sense; and where they are plain and clear, resort to collateral aids to interpretation is unnecessary and cannot be indulged in to narrow or enlarge the text ...."), and noscitur a sociis, Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893) ("It is a familiar rule in the construction of terms to apply to them the meaning naturally attaching to them from their context. Noscitur a sociis is a rule of construction applicable to all written instruments. Where any particular word is obscure or of doubtful meaning, taken by itself, its obscurity or doubt may be removed by reference to associated words. And the meaning of a term may be enlarged or restrained by reference to the object of the whole clause in which it is used.").

[9] See, e.g., Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 663 (1945) ("[I]n determining the meaning and application of [a] constitutional provision, we are concerned with matters of substance, not of form."), overruled on other grounds by Limbach v. Hooven & Allison Co., 466 U.S. 353 (1984); South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 451 (1905) ("[I]t is undoubtedly true that that which is implied is as much a part of the Constitution as that which is expressed."), overruled on other grounds by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 658 (1884) ("[I]n construing the Constitution of the United States, [courts use] the doctrine universally applied to all instruments of writing, that what is implied is as much a part of the instrument as what is expressed. This principle, in its application to the Constitution of the United States, more than to almost any other writing, is a necessity, by reason of the inherent inability to put into words all derivative powers ...."); Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U.S. 80, 87 (1877) ("A mere adherence to the letter [of the Constitution], without reference to the spirit and purpose, may [sometimes] mislead.").

[10] Ala. State Fed'n of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 463 (1945) ("Only those to whom a statute applies and who are adversely affected by it can draw in question its constitutional validity in a declaratory judgment proceeding as in any other."); Premier-Pabst Sales Co. v. Grosscup, 298 U.S. 226, 227 (1936) ("One who would strike down a state statute as obnoxious to the Federal Constitution must show that the alleged unconstitutional feature injures him."); Buscaglia v. Fiddler, 157 F.2d 579, 581 (1st Cir. 1946) ("It is a settled principle of law that no court will consider the constitutionality of a statute unless the record before it affords an adequate factual basis for determining whether the challenged statute applies to and adversely affects the one who draws it in question."); Liberty Nat'l Bank v. Collins, 58 N.E.2d 610, 614 (Ill. 1944) ("The rule is universal that no one can raise a question as to the constitutionality of a statute unless he is injuriously affected by the alleged unconstitutional provisions. It is an established rule in this State that one may not complain of the invalidity of a statutory provision which does not affect him. This court will not determine the constitutionality of the provisions of an act which do not affect the parties to the cause under consideration, or where the party urging the invalidity of such provisions is not in any way aggrieved by their operation." (citation omitted)).

[11] See, e.g., Ison v. W. Vegetable Distribs., 59 P.2d 649, 655 (Ariz. 1936) ("It is the general rule of law that when a party invokes the benefit of a statute, he may not, in one and the same breath, claim a right granted by it and reject the terms upon which the right is granted."); State ex rel. Sorensen v. S. Neb. Power Co., 268 N.W. 284, 285 (Neb. 1936) ("[In this case,] defendants … invoked the statute, … relied upon and t[ook] advantage of it, and are now estopped to assail the statute as unconstitutional."). It is important not to read these too broadly. For example, in In re Auditor Gen., 266 N.W. 464 (Mich. 1936), certain property had been foreclosed upon for delinquent payment of taxes. A statute changed the terms by which foreclosure sales had to be published and announced in the community. The Michigan Supreme Court held that it was not necessary to question the validity of the taxes whose nonpayment led to the foreclosure, to have standing to question the validity of the procedure by which the foreclosure sale was being conducted.

[12] E.g., Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 107 (1946) (a claim that the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 "is void in the absence of an express provision for notice and opportunity for hearing as to security holders regarding proceedings under that section [is groundless]. The short answer is that such a contention can be raised properly only by a security holder who has suffered injury due to lack of notice or opportunity for hearing. No security holder of that type is now before us. The management[] of American … admittedly w[as] notified and participated in the hearings … and … possess[es] no standing to assert the invalidity of that section from the viewpoint of the security holders' constitutional rights to notice and hearing"); Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed'n No. 40, Ry. Employees Dep't, 300 U.S. 515, 558 (1937) (under the Railway Labor Act, a "railroad can complain only of the infringement of its own constitutional immunity, not that of its employees" (citations omitted)).

[13] E.g., Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 337, 353 (1937) ("Constitutional questions are not to be decided hypothetically. When particular facts control the decision they must be shown. Petitioner's contention as to impossibility of proof is premature .... For the present purpose it is sufficient to hold, and we do hold, that the petitioner may constitutionally be required to present all the pertinent facts in the prescribed administrative proceeding and may there raise, and ultimately may present for judicial review, any legal question which may arise as the facts are developed." (citation omitted)).

[۱]

[۲]

[۳]

[۴]

[۵]

[۶]

[۷]

[۸]

[۹]

[۱۰]

[۱۱]

[۱۲]

[۱۳]