سَلَفی به گروهی از مسلماناناهل سنت گفته میشود که به دین اسلام تمسک جسته و خود را پیرو سلف صالح میدانند و در عمل و اعتقادات خود از پیامبر اسلام، صحابه و تابعین تبعیت میکنند. سلفیها تنها قرآن و سنت را منابع احکام و تصمیمات خود میدانند. سلفی گری دو رکن اساسی دارد: یکی بازگشت به شیوهٔ زندگی و مرام سلف صالح و در نهایت سنت حجاز و به خصوص سنت اهل مدینه در ۱۴۰۰ سال پیش، و دوم مبارزه با بدعت، یعنی هر چیزی که سلفیها جدید و خلاف سنت میدانند. سلفیهای معاصر بر معنی خاصی از توحید تأکید زیادی دارند که باعث میشود افراد بسیاری «نامعتقد» به آن تلقی گردند. سلفیگری دارای ابعاد مذهبی، فرهنگی، اجتماعی، و سیاسی است و تأثیری بنیادین بر متفکران مسلمان در گوشه و کنار جهان اسلام گذاشته است.
سلفیگری جدید، رویکردی متمایز از سلفی گری ظاهرگراست که در آغاز قرن بیستم و در واکنش به پیشرفتهای غرب توسط سید جمالالدین اسدآبادی و محمد عبده با هدف آزادسازی امت اسلام از تقلید و جمود و احیای اخلاقی، فرهنگی، و سیاسی بنیانگذاری شد. سلفیان بر بازگرداندن تفکر اسلامی به اصل خالص آن، تبعیت از قرآن و سنت، مردود دانستن تفسیرهای جدید، و حفظ اتحاد امت اسلامی تأکید دارند. آنان تقلید را نفی میکنند و تلاش میکنند سازگاری اسلام و دانش جدید را نشان دهند. مشهورترین گروههای الهام گرفته از سلفیگری اخوانالمسلمین و جماعت اسلامی هستند. در اواخر قرن بیستم، این اصطلاح به اصلاحگران سنتگرا اطلاق میگردد.
ایدئولوژی جهادگرایی سلفی الهامبخش بسیاری از گروههای مسلح مانند القاعده در آغاز قرن ۲۱ بودهاست. این گروهها دیدگاههای سلفیگری علمی (سلفیگری سنتی) را رد کرده و خشونت را راهی مناسب و ضروری برای مقابله با حملات غرب علیه اسلام میدانند. این گروهها متون اسلامی و تاریخ را بازتفسیر نموده و بر آیات نظامی قرآن و تاریخ نظامی اسلام تأکید بسیار دارند. تخمین زده شدهاست که سلفیهای جهادی کمتر از یک درصد کل جمعیت مسلمانان را تشکیل میدهند.
سلف یا سلف صالح (عربی: السلف الصالح) به معنی پیشگامان درستکار و عادل است. در اصطلاح خاص اسلامی، سلف به سه گروه زیر اطلاق میشود.
صحابه: (عربی: الصحابه، «یاران پیغمبر اسلام») به معنی کسانی است که محمد را دیده و در زمان حیات او، دین اسلام را پذیرفتهاند.
تابعین: (عربی: التابعین، «پیروی کنندگان») به کسانی که زمان حیات محمد را درک نکردند اما صحابه محمد را دیده و در زمان حیات آنها دین اسلام را پذیرفتهاند، و در حال ایمان مردهاند، لفظ تابعی اطلاق میشود.
تابع تابعین: (عربی: تابع التابعین، «پیروی کنندگان از پیروی کنندگان») به کسانی که زمان حیات محمد و صحابه را درک نکردند اما تابعین را دیده و دین اسلام را از تابعین فراگرفتهاند لفظ تابع تابعین اطلاق میشود.
احمد بن حنبل آخرین نسل از سلف صالح دانسته میشود. دلیل انتخاب این سه نسل، همراهی با پیامبر و نزدیکی زمانی به او و درک اسلام، و عمل و خدمت به آن توسط آنان دانسته میشود. تعریف سلف صالح بر اساس زمان زندگی آنها ممکن است کافی نباشد چون اهل سنت برخی از شخصیتهای برجسته متاخر مانند ابوحامد غزالی و ابن تیمیه را نیز سلف صالح شمردهاند.
تعریف دقیق سلفیگری کاری دشوار است. «سلفیگری» نامی است که گروهی از اهل سنت به حرکتی اصلاحی برای بازگرداندن اسلام به اصل آن اطلاق میکنند. برای آنکه از خالصبودن اسلامشان مطمئن گردند، سلفیهای معاصر بر معنی خاصی از توحید تأکید زیادی دارند که باعث میشود افراد بسیاری «نامعتقد» به آن تلقی گردند. آنان همچنین تعریف بسیار مفصلی از بدعت دارند که باعث میشود اعمال دینی قابل قبول بسیار محدود شود. آنان به تأثیرات منابع دانش غیر از کتب مذهبی در کسب معلومات مذهبی بسیار با احتیاط مینگرند.
پس از مرگ عثمان و درگیریهایی که پس از آن در میان مسلمانان رخ داد، مناقشاتی در مورد مباحث کلامی پدید آمد و گروههایی پدید آمدند که تلاش کردند این مناقشات را به کمک قیاس، فلسفه، و برداشت شخصی از قرآن حل کنند. برخی از این گروهها خطری را متوجه برداشت ارتودوکس از توحید کردند. اختلافات در نظرهای مسلمانان باعث بوجود آمدن روندی فکری شد که مسلمانان را دعوت به اسلام ساده و برداشتی که براساس قرآن و حدیث سلف صالح بود کند. احمد بن حنبل، پایهگذار چهارمین مذهب اهل سنت، از مهمترین تبیین کنندگان این رویهٔ فکری بود که بعدها سلفیگری را بوجود آورد. ابن حنبل قرآن را بر عقل برتری میداد (و تناقضی میان قرآن و عقل نمیدید) و تاویل و کلام را رد میکرد. او قوانین سختی را برای اجتهاد وضع کرد و استفاده از قیاس را محدود کرد. بعدها ابن تیمیه، از فقهای مکتب حنبلی، در تحول سلفیگری تأثیر فراوانی داشت. او به مخالفت با بدعت پرداخت، به ویژه نوآوریهای صوفیان.
بنیانگذاری سلفیگری معاصر به سید جمالالدین اسدآبادی و محمد عبده در اوایل قرن بیستم نسبت داده میشود. سلفیگری دارای ابعاد مذهبی، فرهنگی، اجتماعی، و سیاسی است و تأثیری بنیادین بر متفکران مسلمان در گوشه و کنار جهان اسلام گذاشته است.
سلفیگری جدید در آغاز قرن بیستم و در واکنش به پیشرفتهای غرب توسط سید جمالالدین اسدآبادی و محمد عبدوه با هدف آزادسازی امت اسلام از تقلید و جمود و احیای اخلاقی، فرهنگی، و سیاسی بنیانگذاری شد. آنان ریشههای بدبختی را نه در تعلیمات اسلام، بلکه در نفوذ تعلیمات خارج از اسلام، نفاق جامعهٔ مسلمانان، و استبداد میدیدند. عبدوه اهداف سلفیه را چنین برمیشمرد:
تا تفکر را از بند تقلید برهاند و دین را همانگونه که مسلمانان اولیه قبل از پدیدآمدن نفاق میفهمدیدند بفهمد و دریافت علم دین را به منابع اولیهٔ آن بازگرداند و با معیار عقل بشری بسنجد.
سلفیه اصلاح سیاسی را برای احیای جامعهٔ اسلامی ضروری میدیدند و استعمار اروپایی رنگ ملی نیز به جنبشهای آنان داده بود. گروههای امروزی سلفی بیش از آنکه به تفکرات مدرن سلفیگری جدید نزدیک باشند، بیشتر ادامهدهندهٔ روش سلفیگری قدیمی هستند.
ایدئولوژی سلفی–جهادی الهام بخش بسیاری از گروههای مسلح مانند القاعده در آغاز قرن ۲۱ بودهاست. این گروهها دیدگاههای سلفیگری علمی (سلفیگری سنتی) را رد کرده و خشونت را راهی مناسب و ضروری برای مقابله با حملات غرب علیه اسلام میدانند. هدف آنان پاککردن جامعهٔ اسلامی از رفتارهای غیراسلامی است. ریشههای این دیدگاه را ممکن است در حرکتهای رادیکال جهادی در دههٔ ۱۹۸۰ میلادی در مصر پیدا کرد. عربستان سعودی نیز به دلیل فعالیتهای محمد بن عبدالوهاب نقش کلیدی در گسترش اسلامگرایی دارد.
رابطه با وهابیت
حامد الگار سه عنصر را بین وهابیت و سلفیگری مشترک میداند:
اینکه همه بالندگیهای پس از دو یا سه نسل اول اسلام (که به آن سلف صالح اطلاق میشود) را بیارزش میدانند.
تصوف را مردود میدانند.
پایبندی به یکی از مذاهب چهارگانه اهل سنّت را ضروری نمیدانند.
به علاوه وی به دو ویژگی اشاره میکند که سلفیها را از وهابیها متفاوت کردهاست:
اینکه سلفیها به جای توسل به زور به متقاعد کردن دیگر مسلمانان به پیوستن به گروهشان روی میآورند.
سلفیها نسبت به بحرانهای سیاسی و اجتماعی-اقتصادی پیش روی جهان اسلام آگاهی دارند.
↑CHRISTIAN CARYL (September 12, 2012). "The Salafi Moment". FP. Retrieved 9 June 2014. Though solid numbers are hard to come by, they're routinely described as the fastest-growing movement in modern-day Islam.
The Salafist doctrine is based on looking back to the early years of the religion to understand how the contemporary world should be ordered. They reject religious innovation or bid'ah, and support the implementation of sharia (Islamic law). The movement is often divided into three categories: the largest group are the purists (or quietists), who avoid politics; the second largest group are the activists, who get involved in politics; the third group are the jihadists, who form a minority and advocate armed struggle to restore the early Islamic movement. In legal matters, the Salafi are divided between those who, in the name of independent legal judgement (ijtihad), reject strict adherence (taqlid) to the four Sunni schools of law (madhahib), and others who remain faithful to these.
At times, Salafism has been deemed a hybrid of Wahhabism and other post-1960s movements. Salafism has become associated with literalist, strict and puritanical approaches to Islam. Western observers and analysts, associate the movement with the jihadis who espouse violent attacks against those they deem to be enemies of Islam as a legitimate expression of Islam.
Salafis consider the hadith that quotes Muhammad saying, "The best of my community are my generation, the ones who follow them and the ones who follow them." as a call to Muslims to follow the example of those first three generations, known collectively as the salaf, or "pious Predecessors" (السلف الصالحas-Salaf as-Ṣāliḥ). The salaf are believed to include Muhammad himself, the "Companions" (Sahabah), the "Followers" (Tabi‘un), and the "Followers of the Followers" (Tabi‘ al-Tabi‘in).
Salafis place great emphasis on practicing actions in accordance with the known sunnah, not only in prayer but in every activity in daily life. For instance, many are careful always to use three fingers when eating, to drink water in three pauses, and to hold it with the right hand while sitting.
Views on Taqlid (scholarly authority)
In legal matters, Salafis are divided between those who, in the name of independent legal judgement (ijtihad), reject strict adherence (taqlid) to the four schools of law (madhahib) and others who remain faithful to these. Salafi scholars from Saudi Arabia are generally bound by Hanbalifiqh and advocate following an Imam rather than having individuals try to interpret and understand scripture alone.
Other Salafi scholars, however, believe that taqlid is unlawful. From their perspective, Muslims who follow a madhab without searching personally for direct evidence may be led astray. The latter group of scholars include Rashid Rida, al-Khajnadee, Muhammad Abduh, Saleem al-Hilali and Nasir al-Din al-Albani.
At the far end of the spectrum of belief, some Salafis hold that adhering to taqlid is an act of polytheism.
Opposition to the use of kalam
Modern-day proponents of the Athari school of theology largely come from the Salafi (or Wahhabi) movement; they uphold the athari works of Ibn Taymiyyah. For followers of the Salafi movement, the "clear" (i.e. zahir, apparent, exoteric or literal) meaning of the Qur'an, and especially the prophetic traditions, has sole authority in matters of belief. They believe that to engage in rational disputation (kalam), even if one arrives at the truth, is absolutely forbidden.
Atharis engage in an amodal reading of the Qur'an, as opposed to one engaged in Ta'wil (metaphorical interpretation). They do not attempt to conceptualize the meanings of the Qur'an rationally, and believe that the "real" modality should be consigned to God alone (tafwid).
Historians and academics date the emergence of Salafism to late 19th-century Egypt. Salafis believe that the label "Salafiyya" existed from the first few generations of Islam and that it is not a modern movement. To justify this view, Salafis rely on a handful of quotes from medieval times where the term Salafi is used. However, these quotes provide dubious and weak evidence for their claim since the term "Salafiyya" and its derivatives are not commonplace in medieval and pre-modern literature.
One of the quotes used as evidence and widely posted on Salafi websites is from the genealogical dictionary of al-Sam'ani (d. 1166), who wrote a short entry about the surname "al-Salafi" (the Salafi): "According to what I heard, this [surname indicates one's] ascription to the pious ancestors and [one's] adoption of their doctrine [madhhabihim]."
The scholar Lauzière comments that, "al-Sam'ani could only list two individuals—a father and his son—who were known by it. Plus, the entry contains blank spaces in lieu of their full names, presumably because al-Sam'ani had forgotten them or did not know them."
Further, he states that "al-Sam'ani's dictionary suggests that the surname was marginal at best, and the lone quotation taken from al-Dhahabi, who wrote 200 years later, does little to prove Salafi claims."
In the modern era, however, many Salafis adopt the surname "al-Salafi" and refer to the label "Salafiyya" in various circumstances to evoke a specific understanding of Islam that is supposed to differ from that of other Sunnis in terms of creed, law, morals, and behavior.
Modern Salafists consider the 18th-century scholar Muhammed bin 'Abd al-Wahhab and many of his students to have been Salafis. He started a reform movement in the remote, sparsely populated region of Najd. He advocated purging practices such as shrine and tomb visitation, which were widespread among Muslims. 'Abd al-Wahhab considered this practice to be idolatry, representative of impurities and inappropriate innovations in Islam.
Some who have observed trends in the Salafist movement have divided Salafis into three groups – purists, activists, and jihadis. Purists focus on education and missionary work to solidify the tawhid; activists focus on political reform and re-establishing a caliphate through the means of evolution, but not violence (sometimes called Salafist activism); and jihadists share similar political goals as the politicians, but engage in violent Jihad (sometimes called Salafi jihadism and/or Qutbism).
"Purists" are Salafists who focus on non-violent da'wah (preaching of Islam), education, and "purification of religious beliefs and practices". They dismiss politics as "a diversion or even innovation that leads people away from Islam".
They never oppose rulers. Madkhalism, as an example, is a strain of Salafists viewed as supportive of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. Taking its name from the controversial Saudi Arabian cleric Rabee al-Madkhali, the movement lost its support in Saudi Arabia proper when several members of the Permanent Committee (the country's clerical body) denounced Madkhali personally. Influence of both the movement and its figureheads have waned so much within the Muslim world that analysts have declared it to be a largely European phenomenon.
Activists are another strain of the global Salafi movement, but different from the Salafi jihadists in that they eschew violence and different from Salafi purists in that they engage in modern political processes. Due to numerical superiority, the movement has been referred to as the mainstream of the Salafist movement at times. This trend, who some call "politicos", see politics as "yet another field in which the Salafi creed has to be applied" in order to safeguard justice and "guarantee that the political rule is based upon the Shari'a".Al–Sahwa Al-Islamiyya (Islamic Awakening), as example, has been involved in peaceful political reform. Safar Al-Hawali and Salman al-Ouda are representatives of this trend. Because of being active on social media, they have earned some support among more educated youth.
It's very simple. We want sharia. Sharia in economy, in politics, in judiciary, in our borders and our foreign relations.
"Salafi Jihadism" was a term invented by Gilles Kepel to describe those self-claiming Salafi groups who began developing an interest in (armed) jihad during the mid-1990s. Practitioners are often referred to as "Salafi jihadis" or "Salafi jihadists". Journalist Bruce Livesey estimates Salafi jihadists constitute less than 1.0 percent of the world's 1.2 billion Muslims (i.e., less than 10 million).
An analysis of the Caucasus Emirate, a Salafi jihadist group, was made in 2014 by Darion Rhodes. It analyzes the group's strict observance of tawhid and its rejection of shirk, taqlid, ijtihad and bid‘ah, while believing that jihad is the only way to advance the cause of Allah on the earth.
Despite some similarities, the different contemporary self-proclaimed Salafist groups often strongly disapprove of one another and deny the other's Islamic character.
Views on violence
In recent years, the Salafi methodology has come to be associated with the jihad of extremist groups that advocate the killing of innocent civilians. The European Parliament, in a report commissioned in 2013 claimed that Wahhabi and Salafi groups are involved, mainly via Saudi charities, in the support and supply of arms to rebel groups around the world. Some Salafi scholars appear to support violent extremism. The Egyptian Salafi cleric Mahmoud Shaaban "appeared on a religious television channel calling for the deaths of main opposition figures Mohammed ElBaradei – a Nobel Peace Prize laureate – and former presidential candidate Hamdeen Sabahi".
Other salafis have rejected the use of violence. The Saudi scholar, Muhammad ibn al Uthaymeen considered suicide bombing to be unlawful and the scholar Abdul Muhsin al-Abbad wrote a treatise entitled: According to which intellect and Religion is Suicide bombings and destruction considered Jihad?.Muhammad Nasiruddin al-Albani stated that "History repeats itself. Everybody claims that the Prophet is their role model. Our Prophet spent the first half of his message making dawah, and he did not start it with jihad".
Some other Islamic groups, particularly some Sufis, have also complained about extremism among some Salafi. It has been noted that the Western association of Salafi ideology with violence stems from writings "through the prism of security studies" that were published in the late 20th century and that continue to persist.
Wahhabism is a more strict, Saudi form of Salafism, according to Mark Durie, who states that Saudi leaders "are active and diligent" using their considerable financial resources "in funding and promoting Salafism all around the world". Ahmad Moussalli tends to agree with the view that Wahhabism is a subset of Salafism, saying "As a rule, all Wahhabis are salafists, but not all salafists are Wahhabis".
However, many scholars and critics distinguish between the old form of Saudi Salafism (termed as Wahhabism) and the new Salafism in Saudi Arabia. Stéphane Lacroix, a fellow and lecturer at Sciences Po in Paris, also affirmed a distinction between the two: "As opposed to Wahhabism, Salafism refers […] to all the hybridations that have taken place since the 1960s between the teachings of Muhammad bin ‘Abd al-Wahhab and other Islamic schools of thought". Hamid Algar and Khaled Abou El Fadl believe, during the 1960s and 70s, Wahhabism rebranded itself as Salafism knowing it could not "spread in the modern Muslim world" as Wahhabism.
Its largesse funded an estimated "90% of the expenses of the entire faith", throughout the Muslim World, according to journalist Dawood al-Shirian. It extended to young and old, from children's madrasas to high-level scholarship. "Books, scholarships, fellowships, mosques" (for example, "more than 1,500 mosques were built from Saudi public funds over the last 50 years") were paid for. It rewarded journalists and academics, who followed it and built satellite campuses around Egypt for Al Azhar, the oldest and most influential Islamic university. Yahya Birt counts spending on "1,500 mosques, 210 Islamic centres and dozens of Muslim academies and schools"  at a cost of around $2–3bn annually since 1975. To put the number into perspective, the propaganda budget of the Soviet Union was about $1bn per annum.
This spending has done much to overwhelm less strict local interpretations of Islam, according to observers like Dawood al-Shirian and Lee Kuan Yew, and has caused the Saudi interpretation (sometimes called "petro-Islam") to be perceived as the correct interpretation – or the "gold standard" of Islam – in many Muslims' minds.
Salafis are often called Wahhabis, which they consider a derogatory term.
Ahl-i Hadith is a religious movement that emerged in Northern India in the mid-nineteenth century. Adherents of Ahl-i-Hadith regard the Quran, sunnah, and hadith as the sole sources of religious authority and oppose everything introduced in Islam after the earliest times. In particular, they reject taqlid (following legal precedent) and favor ijtihad (independent legal reasoning) based on the scriptures. The movement's followers call themselves Salafi, while others refer to them as Wahhabi, or consider them a variation on the Wahhabi movement.
In recent decades the movement has expanded its presence in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan.
There are 5 to 6 million Salafis in Egypt. Salafis in Egypt are not united under a single banner or unified leadership. The main Salafi trends in Egypt are Al-Sunna Al-Muhammadeyya Society, The Salafist Calling, al-Madkhaliyya
Salafism, Activist Salafism, and al-Gam’eyya Al-Shar’eyya. Since 2015 the Egyptian government has banned books associated with the Salafi movement.
Al-Sunna Al-Muhammadeyya Society, also known as Ansar Al-Sunna, was founded in 1926 by Sheikh Mohamed Hamed El-Fiqi (d.), a 1916 graduate of Al-Azhar and a student of the famed Muslim reformer
Muhammed Abduh. It is considered the main Salafi group in Egypt. El-Fiqi's ideas were resentful of Sufism. But unlike Muhammed Abduh, Ansar Al-Sunna follows the tawhid as preached by Ibn Taymiyyah.
Salafist Call is another influential Salafist organisation. It is the outcome of student activism during the 1970s. While many of the activists joined the Muslim Brotherhood, a faction led by Mohammad Ismail al-Muqaddim, influenced by Salafists of Saudi Arabia established the Salafist Calling between 1972 and 1977.
Salafist Call created the Al-Nour Party after the 2011 Egyptian Revolution. It has an ultra-conservative Islamist ideology, which believes in implementing strict Sharia law. In the 2011–12 Egypt parliamentary elections, the Islamist Bloc led by Al‑Nour party received 7,534,266 votes out of a total 27,065,135 correct votes (28%). The Islamist Bloc gained 127 of the 498 parliamentary seats contested, second-place after the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party. Al‑Nour Party itself won 111 of the 127 seats. From January 2013 the party gradually distanced itself from Mohammad Morsi's Brotherhood government, and came to join the opposition in the July 2013 coup which ousted Morsi. A lawsuit against the party was dismissed on 22 September 2014 because the court indicated it had no jurisdiction. A case on the dissolution of the party was adjourned until 17 January 2015. Another court case that was brought forth to dissolve the party was dismissed after the Alexandria Urgent Matters Court ruled on 26 November 2014 that it lacked jurisdiction.
According to Ammar Ali Hassan of al-Ahram, while Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood agree on many issues such as the need to "Islamize" society and restricting private property rights by legally requiring all Muslims to give alms, the former has nevertheless rejected the flexibility of the latter on the issue of whether women and Christians should be entitled to serve in high office, as well as its relatively tolerant attitude towards Iran.
In December 2017, a salafist mosque in Marseille was closed by authorities for preaching about violent jihad.
In August 2018, after the European Court of Human Rights approved the decision, French authorities deported salafist Elhadi Doudi to his home country Algeria because of his radical message he preached in Marseille.
Salafism is a growing movement in Germany whose aim of a Caliphate is incompatible with a Western democracy. According to the German Federal Agency for Civic Education, nearly all Islamist terrorists are Salafists, but not all Salafists are terrorists. Therefore the agency evaluated the Salafist movement beyond the actions by Salafists and analysed the ideological framework of Salafism which is in conflict with the minimal foundations of a democratic and open society. Salafists calling for the death penalty for apostasy is in conflict with freedom of religion. The dualistic view on "true believers" and "false believers" in practice means people being treated unequally on religious grounds. The call for a religious state in the form of a caliphate means that Salafists reject the rule of law and the sovereignty of the people's rule. The Salafist view on gender and society leads to discrimination and the subjugation of women.
Estimates by German interior intelligence service show that it grew from 3,800 members in 2011 to 7,500 members in 2015. In Germany, most of the recruitment to the movement is done on the Internet and also on the streets, a propaganda drive which mostly attracts youth. There are two ideological camps, one advocates political Salafism and directs its recruitment efforts towards non-Muslims and non-Salafist Muslims to gain influence in society. The other and minority movement, the jihadist Salafism, advocates gaining influence by the use of violence and nearly all identified terrorist cells in Germany came from Salafist circles.
In 2015, Sigmar Gabriel, Vice-Chancellor of Germany, spoke out, saying "We need Saudi Arabia to solve the regional conflicts, but we must at the same time make clear that the time to look away is past. Wahhabi mosques are financed all over the world by Saudi Arabia. In Germany, many dangerous Islamists come from these communities."
According to the German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution in Cologne, the number of Salafists in Germany grew from 9,700 in December 2016 to 10,800 in December 2017. In addition to the rise, the Salafist movement in Germany was increasingly fractured which made them harder to monitor by authorities. According to the office, street distributions of Quran took place less frequently which was described as a success for the authorities. Radicalisation changed character, from taking place in mosques and interregional Salafist organisations to more often happening in small circles, which increasingly formed on the internet. A further development was a rise in participation of women.
In February 2017, the German Salafist mosque organisation Berliner Fussilet-Moscheeverein was banned by authorities. Anis Amri, the perpetrator of the 2016 Berlin truck attack, was said to be among its visitors. In March 2017, the German Muslim community organisation Deutschsprachige Islamkreis Hildesheim was also banned after investigators found that its members were preparing to travel to the conflict zone in Syria to fight for the Islamic State. According to the Federal Agency for Civic Education, these examples show that Salafist mosques not only concern themselves with religious matters, but also prepare serious crimes and terrorist activities.
Salafism is opposed by a number of HuiMuslims Sects in China such as by the Gedimu, Sufi Khafiya and Jahriyya, to the extent that even the fundamentalist Yihewani (Ikhwan) Chinese sect, founded by Ma Wanfu after Salafi inspiration, condemned Ma Debao and Ma Zhengqing as heretics when they attempted to introduce Salafism as the main form of Islam. Ma Debao established a Salafi school, called the Sailaifengye (Salafi), in Lanzhou and Linxia. It is completely separate from other Muslim sects in China. Muslim Hui avoid Salafis, even if they are family members. The number of Salafis in China are not included on percentage lists of Muslim sects in China. The Kuomintang Sufi Muslim General Ma Bufang, who backed the Yihewani (Ikhwan) Muslims, persecuted the Salafis and forced them into hiding. They were not allowed to move or worship openly. The Yihewani had become secular and Chinese nationalists; they considered the Salafiyya to be "heterodox" (xie jiao) and people who followed foreigners' teachings (waidao). After the Communists took power, Salafis were allowed to worship openly again.
Many Islamic religious buildings were damaged or destroyed in the Bosnian War during the 90s, estimates say up to 80%, and some are rebuilt with the aid of funds from Saudi Arabia in exchange for Saudi control which became the starting point of the wahhabist influence in Bosnia. According to a study from 2005,[by whom?] over 3% of the mainstream Sunni Muslim population (around 60,000 people) of Bosnia and Herzegovina identified themselves as wahhabist. Despite the wahhabism that came along with Saudi aid to rebuild the mosque and with Gulf-trained imams, all-covering veils such as niqab and burqa are still rare sight.
An attempt at Salafist expansion among the Muslim Chams in Vietnam has been halted by Vietnamese government controls, however, the loss of the Salafis among Chams has been to be benefit of Tablighi Jamaat.
Representatives from the mosque in Gävle are promoting this variant of Islam, which in Sweden is considered extreme. According to researcher Aje Carlbom at Malmö University the organisation behind the missionary work is Swedish United Dawah Center, abbreviated SUDC. SUDC is characterised as a salafist group by a researcher of religious history at Stockholm University and it has many links to British Muslim Abdur Raheem Green. According to professor Mohammed Fazlhashemi, salafists are opposed to rational theology and hate shia Muslims above all. Three Muslim community organisations in Malmö invited reportedly antisemitic and homophobic salafist lecturers such as Salman al-Ouda. One of the organisations, Alhambra is a student society at Malmö University.[undue weight? – discuss]
In Hässleholm the Ljusets moské (translated: "the mosque of light") is spreading salafi ideology and portray shia Muslims as apostates and traitors in social media while the atrocities of the Islamic state are never mentioned. In 2009 the imam Abu al-Hareth at the mosque was sentenced to six years in jail for the attempted murder of a local shia Muslim from Iraq and another member set fire to a shia mosque in Malmö.
Salafists in Sweden are supported financially by Saudi Arabia and Qatar. According to police in Sweden, salafists affect the communities where they are active.
Puritan or quetist Salafists have been known to counter radical extremism and so-called Salafi-jihadists and challenging their influence among vulnerable Muslim communities. 
According to Swedish researcher Magnus Ranstorp, salafism is antidemocratic, homophobic and aims to subjugate women and is therefore opposed to a socital order founded on democracy.
Similar to Saudi Arabia, most citizens of Qatar adhere to a strict sect of Salafism referred to as Wahhabism. The national mosque of Qatar is the Imam Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab Mosque named after the founder of Wahhabism. Similar to Saudi Arabian sponsorship of Salafism, Qatar has also funded the construction of mosques that promote the Wahhabi Salafism.
Unlike the strict practice of Wahhabi Salafism in Saudi Arabia, Qatar has demonstrated an alternative view of Wahhabism. In Qatar, women are allowed by law to drive, non-Muslims have access to pork and liquor through a state-owned distribution center, and religious police do not force businesses to close during prayer times. Also, Qatar hosts branches of several American universities and a "Church City" in which migrant workers may practice their religion. The adoption of a more liberal interpretation of Wahhabism is largely credited to Qatar's young Emir, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani.
Yet, Qatar's more tolerant interpretation of Wahhabism compared to Saudi Arabia has drawn backlash from Qatari citizens and foreigners. The Economist reported that a Qatari cleric criticized the state's acceptance of un-Islamic practices away from the public sphere and complained that Qatari citizens are oppressed. Although Qatari gender separation is less strict than that found in Saudi Arabia, plans to offer co-ed lectures were put aside after threats to boycott Qatar's segregated public university. Meanwhile, there have been reports of local discontent with the sale of alcohol in Qatar.
Qatar has also drawn widespread criticism for attempting to spread its fundamental religious interpretation both through military and non-military channels. Militarily, Qatar has been criticized for funding rebel Islamist extremist fighters in the Libyan Crisis and the Syrian Civil War. In Libya, Qatar funded allies of Ansar al-Sharia, the jihadist group thought to be behind the killing of former U.S. ambassador Christopher Stevens, while channeling weapons and money to the Islamist Ahrar al-Sham group in Syria. In addition, Qatar-based charities and online campaigns, such as Eid Charity and Madid Ahl al-Sham, have a history of financing terrorist groups in Syria. Qatar has also repeatedly provided financial support to the Gaza government led by the militant Hamas organisation while senior Hamas officials have visited Doha and hosted Qatari leaders in Gaza. Qatar also gave approximately $10 billion to the government of Egypt during Mohamed Morsi's time in office.
Non-militarily, Qatar state-funded broadcaster Al Jazeera has come under criticism for selective reporting in coordination with Qatar's foreign policy objectives. In addition, reports have condemned Qatar's financing of the construction of mosques and Islamic centers in Europe as attempts to exert the state's Salafist interpretation of Islam. Reports of Qatar attempting to impact the curriculum of U.S. schools and buy influence in universities have also spread.
The nearby Persian Gulf States of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates have been among the countries that have condemned Qatar's actions. In 2014, the three Persian Gulf countries withdrew their ambassadors from Qatar referencing Qatar's failure to commit to non-interference in the affairs of other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Saudi Arabia has also threatened to block land and sea borders with Qatar.
A 2017 report found the number of Salafi and Wahhabi mosques in Britain had increased from 68 in 2007 to 110 in 2014. The report found that Middle Eastern nations are providing financial support to mosques and Islamic educational institutions, which have been linked to the spread of extremist material with "an illiberal, bigoted Wahhabi ideology".
Worldwide there are roughly 50 million Salafi Sunnis, including roughly 20 to 30 million Salafis in India, 5 to 6 million Salafis in Egypt, and 1.6 million Salafis in Sudan. Salafi communities are smaller elsewhere, including roughly 10,000 in Tunisia, 17,000 in Morocco, 7,000 in Jordan, 17,000 in France and 5,000 in Germany.
As opposed to the traditionalist Salafism discussed throughout this article, academics and historians have used the term "Salafism" to denote modernists, "a school of thought which surfaced in the second half of the 19th century as a reaction to the spread of European ideas" and "sought to expose the roots of modernity within Muslim civilization". They are also known as Modernist Salafis. However contemporary Salafis follow "literal, traditional […] injunctions of the sacred texts", looking to Ibn Taymiyyah rather than the "somewhat freewheeling interpretation" of 19th-century figures Muhammad Abduh, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, and Rashid Rida.
The origins of contemporary Salafism in the modernist "Salafi Movement" of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh is noted by some, while others say Islamic Modernism only influenced contemporary Salafism. However, the former notion has been rejected by majority. According to Quintan Wiktorowicz:
There has been some confusion in recent years because both the Islamic modernists and the contemporary Salafis refer (referred) to themselves as al-salafiyya, leading some observers to erroneously conclude a common ideological lineage. The earlier salafiyya (modernists), however, were predominantly rationalist Asharis.
In this context "in terms of their respective formation, Wahhabism and Salafism were quite distinct. Wahhabism was a pared-down Islam that rejected modern influences, while Salafism sought to reconcile Islam with modernism. What they had in common is that both rejected traditional teachings on Islam in favor of direct, ‘fundamentalist’ reinterpretation. Although Salafism and Wahhabism began as two distinct movements, Faisal's embrace of Salafi (Muslim Brotherhood) pan-Islamism resulted in cross-pollination between ibn Abd al-Wahhab's teachings on tawhid, shirk and bid‘ah and Salafi interpretations of ahadith (the sayings of Muhammad). Some Salafis nominated ibn Abd al-Wahhab as one of the Salaf (retrospectively bringing Wahhabism into the fold of Salafism), and the Muwahideen began calling themselves Salafis."
In the broadest sense
In a broad sense, Salafism is similar to Non-denominational Islam (NDM), in the sense some of its adherents do not follow a particular creed. Salafi (follower of Salaf) means any reform movement that calls for resurrection of Islam by going back to its origin. In line with Wahhabism they promote a literal understanding of the sacred texts of Islam and reject other more liberal reformist movements such as those inspired for example by Muhammad Abduh or by Muhammad Iqbal.
Scholars from Al-Azhar University of Cairo produced a work of religious opinions entitled al-Radd (The Response) to refute the views of the Salafi movement.Al-Radd singles out numerous Salafi aberrations – in terms of ritual prayer alone it targets for criticism the following Salafi claims:
The claim that it is prohibited to recite God's name during the minor ablution [Fatwa 50]
The claim that it is obligatory for men and women to perform the major ablution on Friday [Fatwa 63]
The claim that it is prohibited to own a dog for reasons other than hunting [Fatwa 134]
The claim that it is prohibited to use alcohol for perfumes [Fatwa 85].
One of the authors of al-Radd, the Professor of Law Anas Abu Shady states that, "they [the Salafis] want to be everything to everyone. They're interested not only in the evident (al-zahir), although most of their law goes back to the Muhalla [of the Ẓāhirī scholar Ibn Hazm], but they also are convinced that they alone understand the hidden (al-batin)!"
The Syrian scholar Mohamed Said Ramadan Al-Bouti wrote a number of works refuting Salafism including Al-La Madhhabiyya (Abandoning the Madhhabs) is the most dangerous Bid‘ah Threatening the Islamic Shari'a (Damascus: Dar al-Farabi 2010) and Al-Salafiyyawas a blessed epoch, not a school of thought (Damascus: Dar al-Fikr, 1990). The latter is perhaps the most famous refutation of Salafism in the twentieth century.
Numerous academic rebuttals of Salafism have been produced in the English language by Khaled Abou El Fadl of the UCLA School of Law, Timothy Winter of Cambridge University and G.F. Haddad. El Fadl argues that fanatical groups such as al-Qaeda "derive their theological premises from the intolerant Puritanism of the Wahhabi and Salafi creeds". He also suggests that the extreme intolerance and even endorsement of terrorism manifest in Wahhabism and Salafism represents a deviation from Muslim historical traditions. El-Fadl also argues that the Salafi methodology "drifted into stifling apologetics" by the mid-20th century, a reaction against "anxiety" to "render Islam compatible with modernity," by its leaders earlier in the century.
Although Salafist claim to re-establish Islamic values and protects Islamic culture, sociological observations show that they often interpret it in a manner which does not match with Islamic traditions, with some members of the movement regarding inherit elements of Islamic culture, such as music, poetry, literature and philosophy as works of the devil. Generally, Salafis do not adhere to traditional Islamic communities, and those who do, often oppose the traditional Islamic values.
Salafis are accused of having a double-standard on their views on innovation, rejecting good innovations and unwittingly accepting harmful ones. Classical scholars (including imam Nawawi, who is widely praised by Salafis) categorized innovation into 5 types, yet Salafis consider all innovation to be sinful. This creates a strange paradox where they unwittingly accept some innovations and reject others. The compilation of the Qur'an under Abu Bakr's caliphate was an innovation, yet is accepted by Orthodox Muslims as an obligatory innovation to preserve the Qur'an. The notorious Salafi creed, which divides tawhid into 3 types, is itself an innovation which leads to liberal excommunication, prolific accusations of shirk, and violence against other Muslims.
German government's statement on Salafism
German government officials have stated that Salafism has a strong link to terrorism but have clarified that not all Salafists are terrorists. The statements by German government officials criticizing Salafism were televised by Deutsche Welle during April 2012.
^ abFor example: "Salafism originated in the mid to late 19th-century as an intellectual movement at al-Azhar University, led by Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905), Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839–1897) and Rashid Rida (1865–1935)." from Understanding the Origins of Wahhabism and SalafismArchived 3 March 2011 at the Wayback Machine, by Trevor Stanley. Terrorism Monitor Volume 3, Issue 14. 15 July 2005
^ abHaykel, Bernard. "Sufism and Salafism in Syria". 11 May 2007. Syria Comment. Retrieved 22 May 2013. The Salafis of the Muhammad Abduh variety no longer exist, as far as I can tell, and certainly are not thought of by others as Salafis since this term has been appropriated/co-opted fully by Salafis of the Ahl al-Hadith/Wahhabi variety.
^Haykel, Bernard (2009). "Chapter 1: On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action". In Meijer, Roel (ed.). Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement. Columbia University Press. p. 34. ISBN978-0-231-15420-8.
^Miriam Cooke, Bruce B. Lawrence, Muslim Networks from Hajj to Hip Hop, p. 213
^"Thus he [Rida] opposed Taqlid and called for and practiced absolute ijtihad." Clinton Bennett, The Bloomsbury Companion to Islamic Studies, p. 174. See also, Richard Gauvain, Salafi Ritual Purity: In the Presence of God, Introduction, p. 9
^"Abduh's statement of purpose was: To liberate thought from the shackles of Taqlid and understand religion as it was understood by the Salaf." Bennett, The Bloomsbury Companion to Islamic Studies, p. 168.
^"From there he [Albani] learned to oppose taqlid in a madhab." Bennett, The Bloomsbury Companion to Islamic Studies, p. 174. "Al-Albani had denounced Wahhabi attachment to the Hanbali school." Stephane Lacroix, George Holoch, Awakening Islam, p. 85
^"For many Salafis, both modernist and conservative, "worship" of created beings includes practicing taqlid within a madhab of fiqh." Bennett, The Bloomsbury Companion to Islamic Studies, p. 165
^Lauzière, Henri (24 July 2008). The Evolution of the Salafiyya in the Twentieth Century through the life and thought of Taqi al-Din al-Hilali. Phd Dissertation Georgetown University. p. 62. However, the evidence they have gathered so far is tenuous. Puristic Salafis rely on a few quotes that, while lending support to their argument, hardly prove it beyond any doubt
^Lauzière, Henri (24 July 2008). The Evolution of the Salafiyya in the Twentieth Century through the life and thought of Taqi al-Din al-Hilali. Phd Dissertation Georgetown University. p. 61.
^George Joffé, Islamist Radicalisation in Europe and the Middle East: Reassessing the Causes of Terrorism, p. 317. London: I.B. Tauris, 2013.
^ abThe Transmission and Dynamics of the Textual Sources of Islam: Essays in Honour of Harald Motzki, eds. Nicolet Boekhoff-van der Voort, Kees Versteegh and Joas Wagemakers, p. 382. Leiden: Brill Publishers, 2011.
^The Observer, Violent tide of Salafism threatens the Arab spring, by Peter Beaumont and Patrick Kingsley, 10 February 2013.
^Reuters, Egypt orders cleric held over ElBaradei death call, by Marwa Awad, edited by Paul Taylor and Jon Hemming, 11 February 2013.
^ abGabriel G. Tabarani, Jihad's New Heartlands: Why the West Has Failed to Contain Islamic Fundamentalism, p. 26.
^Richard Gauvain, Salafi Ritual Purity: In the Presence of God, p. 331
^Quintan Wiktorowicz, Anatomy of the Salafi Movement, p. 217.
^Meijer, Roel (2009). "Introduction". In Meijer, Roel (ed.). Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement. Columbia University Press. p. 34. ISBN978-0-231-15420-8.
^Murphy, Caryle (5 September 2006). "For Conservative Muslims, Goal of Isolation a Challenge". Washington Post. The kind of Islam practiced at Dar-us-Salaam, known as Salafism, once had a significant foothold among area Muslims, in large part because of an aggressive missionary effort by the government of Saudi Arabia. Salafism and its strict Saudi version, known as Wahhabism, struck a chord with many Muslim immigrants who took a dim view of the United States' sexually saturated pop culture and who were ambivalent about participating in a secular political system.
^Mark Durie (6 June 2013). "Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood: What is the difference?". Middle East Forum. What is called Wahhabism – the official religious ideology of the Saudi state – is a form of Salafism. Strictly speaking, 'Wahhabism' is not a movement, but a label used mainly by non-Muslims to refer to Saudi Salafism, referencing the name of an influential 18th-century Salafi teacher, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. ... The continuing impact of Salafi dogma in Saudi Arabia means that Saudi leaders are active and diligent in funding and promoting Salafism all around the world. If there is a mosque receiving Saudi funding in your city today, in every likelihood it is a Salafi mosque. Saudi money has also leveraged Salafi teachings through TV stations, websites and publications.
^Dillon, Michael R. "WAHHABISM: IS IT A FACTOR IN THE SPREAD OF GLOBAL TERRORISM?"(PDF). September 2009. Naval Post-Graduate School. pp. 3–4. Retrieved 2 April 2014. Hamid Algar […] emphasizes the strong influence of the Saudi petrodollar in the propagation of Wahhabism, but also attributes the political situation of the Arab world at the time as a contributing factor that led to the co-opting of Salafism. […] Khaled Abou El Fadl, […] expresses the opinion that Wahhabism would not have been able to spread in the modern Muslim world […] it would have to be spread under the banner of Salafism.8 This attachment of Wahhabism to Salafism was needed as Salafism was a much more 'credible paradigm in Islam'; making it an ideal medium for Wahhabism. […] The co-opting of Salafism by Wahhabism was not completed until the 1970s when the Wahhabis stripped away some of their extreme intolerance and co-opted the symbolism and language of Salafism; making them practically indistinguishable.
^Abou El Fadl, Khaled (2005). The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists. p. 75.
^ abDawood al-Shirian, 'What Is Saudi Arabia Going to Do?' Al-Hayat, 19 May 2003
^Abou al Fadl, Khaled, The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists, Harper SanFrancisco, 2005, pp. 48–64
^Murphy, Caryle, Passion for Islam – Shaping the Modern Middle East: the Egyptian Experience, Simon & Schuster, 2002 p. 32
^Coolsaet, Rik. "Cycles of Revolutionary Terrorism, Chapter 7". In Rik Coolsaet (ed.). Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge: European and American. Ashgate Publishing Ltd. The proliferation of brochures, free qurans and new Islamic centres in Malaga, Madrid, Milat, Mantes-la-Jolie, Edinburgh, Brussels, Lisbon, Zagreb, Washington, Chicago, and Toronto; the financing of Islamic Studies chairs in American universities; the growth of Internet sites: all of these elements have facilitated access to Wahhabi teachings and the promotion of Wahhabism as the sole legitimate guardian of Islamic thought.
^Kuan Yew Lee; Ali Wyne. Lee Kuan Yew: The Grand Master's Insights on China, the United States, and . MIT Press. But over the last 30-odd years, since the oil crisis and the petrodollars became a major factor in the Muslim world, the extremists have been proleytizing, building mosques, religious schools where they teach Wahhabism […] sending out preachers, and having conferences. Globalizing, networking. And slowly they have convinced the Southeast Asian Muslims, and indeed Muslims throughout the world, that the gold standard is Saudi Arabia, that that is the real good Muslim.
^Laurent Bonnefoy, Salafism in Yemen: Transnationalism and Religious Identity, Columbia University Press/Hurst, 2011, ISBN978-1-84904-131-7, p. 245.
^ abcJohn L. Esposito, ed. (2014). "Ahl-i Hadith". The Oxford Dictionary of Islam. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
^Lieven, Anatol (2011). Pakistan: A Hard Country. New York: PublicAffairs. p. 128. ISBN978-1-61039-023-1. Ahl-e-Hadith ... a branch of the international Salafi ... tradition, heavily influenced by Wahabism.
^Jaschke, Hans-Gerd. "Orte der islamistischen Radikalisierung | bpb". bpb.de (in German). Retrieved 1 December 2018. Die beiden Verbote zeigen, dass in salafistischen Moscheen nicht nur auf religiöse Art rekrutiert und agiert wird, sondern in einigen von ihnen schwere Straftaten bis hin zu terroristischen Aktionen geplant wurden.
^CHRISTIAN CARYL (12 September 2012). "The Salafi Moment". FP. Retrieved 9 June 2014. Though solid numbers are hard to come by, they're routinely described as the fastest-growing movement in modern-day Islam.
^"‘Abduh clearly did not claim to be a Salafi nor identified his followers as Salafis. He simply referred al-Salafiyyin in the context of theological debates as Sunni Muslims who differed from Ash’arites based on their strict adherence to ‘aqidat al-salaf (the creed of the forefather) (Lauziere, 2010)"
^The split between Qatar and the GCC won’t be permanent "However, the intra-Sunni divides have not been so clear to foreign observers. Those divides include the following: purist Salafism (which many call "Wahhabism"), modernist Salafism (which is the main intellectual ancestor of the Muslim Brotherhood) and classical Sunnism (which is the mainstream of Islamic religious institutions in the region historically"
^Račius, Egdūnas. "Islamic Law in Lithuania? Its Institutionalisation, Limits and Prospects for Application." Exploring the Multitude of Muslims in Europe: Essays in Honour of Jørgen S. Nielsen (2018): 109.
^Abou El Fadl, Khaled, The Great Theft, Harper San Francisco, 2005, p. 77
^As-Sunnah Foundation of America, Wahhabism: Understanding the Roots and Role Models of Islamic Extremism by Zubair Qamar, condensed and edited by ASFA staff. This article lists 65 Sunni scholars from different time periods, whom the article claims were opposed to either the Salafi or the Wahhabi movements. The article claims that the Wahhabi movement is the same thing as the Salafi movement.
^The Independent, The photos Saudi Arabia doesn't want seen – and proof Islam's most holy relics are being demolished in Mecca , by Jerome Taylor, 15 March 2013. The article says that the Saudis are dismantling some old parts the Grand Mosque at Mecca, as part of work to make the mosque larger, and that the sites of other very old buildings in Mecca and Medina have been redevloped over the past twenty years. The article claims that many senior Wahhabis believe that preserving historic relics for their own sake is undesirable because it encourages idolatry (shirq).
^Caryle Murphy (15 July 2010). "A Kingdom Divided". GlobalPost. Archived from the original on 5 May 2014. Retrieved 6 May 2014. As Grand Mufti, the late Bin Baz was the most prominent proponent of Saudi Arabia's ultraconservative strain of Salafi Islam, sometimes known as Wahhabism
^Lewis, Philip (12 February 2008). Young, British and Muslim. Bloomsbury Academic. p. 192. ISBN9780826497291. Two other Wahhabi/ Salafi individuals are worth mentioning. The first is Sheikh Abdullah el-Faisal, who merited a full front-page article in The Times in February 2002
^Caryle Murphy (15 July 2010). "A Kingdom Divided". GlobalPost. Archived from the original on 5 May 2014. Retrieved 6 May 2014. First, there is the void created by the 1999 death of the elder Bin Baz and that of another senior scholar, Muhammad Salih al Uthaymin, two years later. Both were regarded as giants in conservative Salafi Islam and are still revered by its adherents. Since their passing, no one "has emerged with that degree of authority in the Saudi religious establishment," said David Dean Commins, history professor at Dickinson College and author of The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia.
^Fair, C. Christine; Watson, Sarah J. (18 February 2015). Pakistan's Enduring Challenges. University of Pennsylvania Press. p. 246. ISBN9780812246902. Osama bin Laden was a hard-core Salafi who openly espoused violence against the United States in order to achieve Salafi goals.
^Swami, Praveen (2011). "Islamist terrorism in India". In Warikoo, Kulbhushan (ed.). Religion and Security in South and Central Asia. London, England: Taylor & Francis. p. 61. ISBN9780415575904. To examine this infrastructure, it is useful to consider the case of Zakir Naik, perhaps the most influential Salafi ideologue in India.