ساتون و ورتیگانس دیدگاههای غرب از اسلام را بر اساس کلیشه دین ذاتاً خشن و با مشخصه 'دین شمشیر' توصیف میکنند. از این نظر، دیدگاه غربی نسبت به اسلام دینی «تحت سلطه مناقشات، پرخاشگری، بنیادگرایی و تروریسم در مقیاس جهانی است.»" برای مثال مواردی چون حملات ۱۱ سپتامبر به این دیدگاه در نظر غیرمسلمانان دامن میزند که اسلام با خشونت در رابطه است. طبق آمارگیری از گروهی مسیحیان باپتیست جنوبی، از هر سه کشیش پروتستان دو تا اسلام را دینی "خطرناک" میدانند.
از سوی دیگر، در جواب چنین اتهاماتی، کسانی چون رام پونیانی اظهار میکنند «اسلام خشونت را قبول نمیکند، ولی مانند ادیان دیگر به "دفاع از خود" معتقد است.»
آموزههای قرآن درباره مسائل جنگ و صلح به موضوع بحث داغی در سالهای اخیر تبدیل شدهاند. در یک سو، برخی منتقدان معتقدند برخی آیههای قرآن اجازه حمله نظامی علیه ناباوران هم در زمان زندگی محمد و هم بعد از آن را میدهد. قرآن میگوید «ای کسانی که ایمان آوردهاید با کافرانی که به شما نزدیکترند پیکار کنید»(توبه 123) از سوی دیگر، برخی محققان دیگر استدلال میکنند که این آیات قرآن نباید خارج از متن و زمینه آن تفسیر شوند. از نظر این عده، آیات قرآن خشونت را ممنوع اعلام کرده، و فقط در دفاع از خود اجازه جنگ میدهند.
به دیدگاه مسلمانان جهاد اسلامی دارای اهداف مقدسی مانند براندازی شرک و کفر، مبارزه با تبهکاران و گمراهان، پاسداری از نظام اسلامی و دفاع از مرزها است و از نگر ایشان این اهداف موجب برتری این نوع جنگ نسبت به دیگر جنگها میشود.
محقق خوئی با اینکه مسئلهٔ ولایت فقیه را از نظر علمی قبول ندارند، اما یک فتوای منحصری دارند که میفرمایند: جهاد ابتدایی نه تنها در اسلام مشروع و واجب است و نیازی به اذن معصوم ندارد، حتّی بالاتر، نیازی به اذن فقیه نیز ندارد، یعنی اگر در یک زمانی، عموم مؤمنین دیدند، شرایط جهاد ابتدایی هست، باید انجام بدهند.
رابطه بین اسلام و خشونت خانگی مورد مناقشهاست. این ایدهها بهطور مبهم اشاره به آیه ۳۴ سوره نساء میکنند که درباره اشکال "ضرب" در شرایط خاص بحث میکند. این آیه می گوید که اگر زنتان از آیات پیروی نکرد ابتدا او را نصیحت کنید اگر گوش نداد از او در تخت دوری کنید اگر باز هم گوش نداد او را مورد ضرب قرار دهید. برخی محققان بر این باورند که "ضرب" در مرحله آخر است و در آن اکراه وجود دارد. از نظر آنها این زدن به آرامی است، طوریکه موجب درد یا آسیبدیدگی نشود.
امر ظالمانه اسلامی نیست. عدالت اسلامی نیست، بلکه اسلام است که باید عادلانه باشد. عدالت ارزشی فرا دینی است. اگر چیزی عادلانه نباشد، بی هیچ شک اسلامی نیست. عدالت از آنجا که معقولهای عقلی است باید در هر زمانهای بازاندیشی شود.
در متون دینی اموری است که توسط عقل انسانی قابل درک است. البته برخی گزارههای اسلامی (مثلاً گزارههای عرفانی) فراعقلی (یا عقل گریز) هستند، اما عقل ستیز نیستند. تمامی گزارههای عقل ستیز غیراسلامی و ضداسلامی هستند. اسلام ، امور ضد خرد و خرد ستیز را به ساحت دین راه نمیدهد.
خداوند رحمت را بر خود واجب کردهاست (سوره انعام، آیات ۵۴،۱۲). رحمت محبت به خلق، مهربانی و شفقت است، و مناسبات انسانی باید مبتنی بر رحمت باشد. سرلوحهٔ رفتار اسلامی رحمت به مردم، محبت به آنها، و لطافت و ظرافت با آنها است.
امور غیراخلاقی، اسلامی نیستند. در این رویکرد، مسلمان عامل به اصل طلایی اخلاق است: هر آنچه برای خود میپسندد برای دیگران هم میپسندد و آنچه را برای خود نمیپسندد برای دیگری نیزی نمیپسندد.
تنها ایمان برآمده از اختیار انسانها ارزشمند است. اسلام با آزادی و اختیار همراه است.
علم و کارشناسی
آنگونه زندگی کن که خداوند حاضر است و ناظر، آنگونه که خدا معنای زندگی است. لذا نزد اسلام سکولاریسم ذهنی جایگاهی ندارد. اسلام قائل به خصوصی سازی دین نیست. اما اسلام قائل به سکولاریسم عینی، یعنی جدایی نهاد دین از نهاد حکومت است. برای برقرار کردن امور و ضوابط دینی در سطح عمومی، اسلام با رعایت تمامی اصول دموکراسی و دموکراتیک، و با رقابتی سالم و آزاد وارد جامعه میشود.
بر اساس پژوهشگر اسلامی، خالد محمد، روشنفکران مسلمان در سراسر جهان به خاطر انتقاد از جنبههایی از اسلام سنتی و مدرن مجازات میشوند؛ برای مثال محمد سید الاشاوی در مصر برای حفاظت از خود در حصر خانگی است؛ یا عبدالکریم سروش در ایران برای ابراز پرس و جو مورد ضرب و شتم قرار گرفت. محمود طه و محمود محمد طه، در سودان کشته شدهاست، و موارد دیگر.
سید هاشم آقاجری، استاد دانشگاه ایرانی، به دلیل سخنرانی که در آن از برخی اعمال اسلامی در ایران انتقاد کرده و آنها را در تناقض با نگرههای اسلام اصلی دانسته بود، به مرگ محکوم شد. به ویژه به دلیل گفتن اینکه مسلمانان "میمون" نیستند و نباید کورکورانه پیرو روحانیون باشند. این محکومیت بعداً به سه سال زندان کاهش یافت، و او در سال ۲۰۰۴، دو سال بعد از محکومیت آزاد شد.
تئودور ون گوگ فیلمساز هلندی در ۲ نوامبر ۲۰۰۴ به دلیل ساخت فیلمی ۱۰ دقیقهای درباره بدرفتاری با زنان در اسلام به نام تسلیم (Submission) توسط محمد بویری به قتل رسید. نامهای تهدیدآمیز به نویسنده این فیلم، آیان حرصی علی با چاقو به بدن تئو ون گوگ سنجاق شده بود. آیان حرصی علی، بلافاصله بعد از این ترور به مخفیگاه منتقل شد و هماکنون توسط بادیگاردها حفاظت میشود.
↑Sohail H. Hashmi, David Miller, Boundaries and Justice: diverse ethical perspectives, Princeton University Press, p.197
↑Khaleel Muhammad, professor of religious studies at San Diego State University, states, regarding his discussion with the critic Robert Spencer, that "when I am told ... that Jihad only means war, or that I have to accept interpretations of the Qur'an that non-Muslims (with no good intentions or knowledge of Islam) seek to force upon me, I see a certain agendum developing: one that is based on hate, and I refuse to be part of such an intellectual crime." بایگانیشده در ۸ ژوئیه ۲۰۰۸ توسط Wayback Machine
↑Ali, Maulana Muhammad; The Religion of Islam (6th Edition), Ch V "Jihad" Page 414 "When shall war cease". Published by Lahore Ahmadiyya Movement for the Propagation of Islam
↑Sadr-u-Din, Maulvi. "Qur'an and War", page 8. Published by The Muslim Book Society, Lahore, Pakistan.
↑Article on Jihad by Dr. G. W. Leitner (founder of The Oriental Institute, UK) published in Asiatic Quarterly Review, 1886. ("Jihad, even when explained as a righteous effort of waging war in self-defense against the grossest outrage on one's religion, is strictly limited..")
↑The Qur'anic Commandments Regarding War/Jihad An English rendering of an Urdu article appearing in Basharat-e-Ahmadiyya Vol. I, p. 228-232, by Dr. Basharat Ahmad; published by the Lahore Ahmadiyya Movement for the Propagation of Islam
↑Ali, Maulana Muhammad; The Religion of Islam (6th Edition), Ch V "Jihad" Pages 411-413. Published by The Lahore Ahmadiyya Movement 
↑ ۲۹٫۰۲۹٫۱Rawshandil، Jalīl؛ Sharon Chadha (۲۰۰۶). Jihad and international security. Macmillan. ص. ۱۰. شابک۱-۴۰۳۹-۷۱۹۲-۷. خطای یادکرد: برچسب <ref> نامعتبر؛ نام «jalil» چندین بار با محتوای متفاوت تعریف شدهاست. (صفحهٔ راهنما را مطالعه کنید.).
↑Mandaville، Michael (۲۰۰۹). Citizen-Soldier Handbook: 101 Ways Every American Can Fight Terrorism. Dog Ear Publishing. ص. ۴۶. شابک۱-۵۹۸۵۸-۶۷۱-۸.
↑Endings: a sociology of death and dying, Michael C. Kearl (1989) p. 187
The first military rulings were formulated during the first hundred years after Muhammad established an Islamic state in Medina. These rulings evolved in accordance with the interpretations of the Quran (the Muslim Holy scriptures) and Hadith (the recorded traditions of Muhammad). The key themes in these rulings were the justness of war (see Justice in the Quran), and the injunction to jihad. The rulings do not cover feuds and armed conflicts in general. The millennium of Muslim conquests could be classified, technically, as a religious war.
Some have pointed out that the current Western view of the need for a clear separation between Church and State was only first legislated into effect after 18 centuries of Christianity in the Western world. While some majority Muslim governments such as Turkey and many of the majority Muslim former Soviet republics have officially attempted to incorporate this principle of such a separation of powers into their governments, the concept within the Muslim world yet remains somewhat in a state of ongoing evolution and flux.
Islam has never had any officially recognized tradition of pacifism, and throughout its history warfare has been an integral part of the Islamic theological system. Since the time of Muhammad, Islam has considered warfare to be a legitimate expression of religious faith, and has accepted its use for the defense of Islam. During approximately the first 1,000 years of its existence, the use of warfare by Muslim majority governments often resulted in the de facto propagation of Islam.
While the early spread of Islam was often borne on the back of military conquest, within Christianity its early spread was often a matter of political expediency. The minority Sufi movement within Islam, which includes certain pacifist elements, has often been officially "tolerated" by many Muslim majority governments. Additionally, some notable Muslim clerics, such as Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan have developed alternative non-violent Muslim theologies. Some hold that the formal juristic definition of war in Islam constitutes an irrevokable and permanent link within Islam between the political and religious justifications for war. The Quranic concept of Jihad includes aspects of both a physical and an internal struggle.
Jihad (جهاد) is an Islamic term referring to the religious duty of Muslims to maintain the religion. In Arabic, the word jihād is a noun meaning "to strive, to apply oneself, to struggle, to persevere". A person engaged in jihad is called a mujahid, the plural of which is mujahideen (مجاهدين). The word jihad appears frequently in the Quran, often in the idiomatic expression "striving in the way of God (al-jihad fi sabil Allah)", to refer to the act of striving to serve the purposes of God on this earth. According to the classical Sharia law manual of Shafi'i, Reliance of the Traveller, Jihad means to war against non-Muslims, and is etymologically derived from the word mujahada signifying warfare to establish the religion.[page needed] Jihad is sometimes referred to as the sixth pillar of Islam, though it occupies no such official status. In Twelver Shi'a Islam, however, jihad is one of the ten Practices of the Religion.
Muslims and scholars do not all agree on its definition. Many observers—both Muslim and non-Muslim—as well as the Dictionary of Islam, talk of jihad having two meanings: an inner spiritual struggle (the "greater jihad"), and an outer physical struggle against the enemies of Islam (the "lesser jihad") which may take a violent or non-violent form. Jihad is often translated as "Holy War", although this term is controversial. According to orientalist Bernard Lewis, "the overwhelming majority of classical theologians, jurists", and specialists in the hadith "understood the obligation of jihad in a military sense."Javed Ahmad Ghamidi states that there is consensus among Islamic scholars that the concept of jihad will always include armed struggle against wrongdoers.
According to Jonathan Berkey, jihad in the Quran was maybe originally intended against Muhammad's local enemies, the pagans of Mecca or the Jews of Medina, but the Quranic statements supporting jihad could be redirected once new enemies appeared. The first documentation of the law of Jihad was written by 'Abd al-Rahman al-Awza'i and Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Shaybani.
The first forms of military Jihad occurred after the migration (hijra) of Muhammad and his small group of followers to Medina from Mecca and the conversion of several inhabitants of the city to Islam. The first revelation concerning the struggle against the Meccans was surah 22, verses 39–40:
The main focus of Muhammad's later years was increasing the number of allies as well as the amount of territory under Muslim control.
According to Richard Edwards and Sherifa Zuhur, offensive jihad was the type of jihad practiced by the early Muslim community, because their weakness meant "no defensive action would have sufficed to protect them against the allied tribal forces determined to exterminate them." Jihad as a collective duty (Fard Kifaya) and offensive jihad are synonymous in classical Islamic law and tradition, which also asserted that offensive jihad could only be declared by the caliph, but an "individually incumbent jihad" (Fard Ayn) required only "awareness of an oppression targeting Islam or Islamic peoples."
Tina Magaard, associate professor at the Aarhus University Department of Business Development and Technology, has analyzed the texts of the 10 largest religions in the world. In an interview, she stated that the basic texts of Islam call for violence and aggression against followers of other faiths to a greater extent than texts of other religions. She has also argued that they contain direct incitements to terrorism.
According to a number of sources, Shia doctrine taught that jihad (or at least full scale jihad) can only be carried out under the leadership of the Imam (who will return from occultation to bring absolute justice to the world). However, "struggles to defend Islam" are permissible before his return.
Ghazi (غازي) is an Arabic term originally referring to an individual who participates in Ghazw (غزو), meaning military expeditions or raiding; after the emergence of Islam, it took on new connotations of religious warfare. The related word Ghazwa (غزوة) is a singulative form meaning a battle or military expedition, often one led by Muhammad.
The Caravan raids were a series of raids in which Muhammed and his companions participated. The raids were generally offensive and carried out to gather intelligence or seize the trade goods of caravans financed by the Quraysh. The raids were intended to weaken the economy of Mecca by Muhammad. His followers were also impoverished. Muhammad broke an Arab tradition of not attacking one's own kinsmen by raiding caravans.
Islamic Doctrines teachings on matters of war and peace have become topics of heated discussion in recent years. Charles Matthews writes that there is a "large debate about what the Quran commands as regards the 'sword verses' and the 'peace verses'". According to Matthews, "the question of the proper prioritization of these verses, and how they should be understood in relation to one another, has been a central issue for Islamic thinking about war." According to Dipak Gupta, "much of the religious justification of violence against nonbelievers (Dar ul Kufr) by the promoters of jihad is based on the Quranic "sword verses".
The Quran contains passages that could be used to glorify or endorse violence.
On the other hand, other scholars argue that such verses of the Qur'an are interpreted out of context, Micheline R. Ishay has argued that "the Quran justifies wars for self-defense to protect Islamic communities against internal or external aggression by non-Islamic populations, and wars waged against those who 'violate their oaths' by breaking a treaty". and British orientalistGottlieb Wilhelm Leitner stated that jihad, even in self-defence, is "strictly limited".
However, according to Oliver Leaman, a number of Islamic jurists asserted the primacy of the "sword verses" over the conciliatory verses in specific historical circumstances. For example, according to Diane Morgan, Ibn Kathir (1301–1372) asserted that the Sword Verse abrogated all peace treaties that had been promulgated between Muhammad and idolaters.
Islamic modernists reject the abrogating status of the sword verses, which would result in the abrogation (naskh) of numerous Quranic verses that counsel peace and reconciliation.
Prior to the Hijra travel Muhammad struggled non-violently against his oppressors in Mecca. It wasn't until after the exile that the Quranic revelations began to adopt a more defensive perspective. From that point onward, those dubious about the need to go to war were typically portrayed as lazy cowards allowing their love of peace to become a fitna to them.
In 2016, the government of Morocco developed a strategy to further adherence to the Maliki Islamic school of thought in order to promote tolerance and moderation. The authorities removed Quranic passages that were deemed too violent from religion education textbooks. As a result, the textbooks were reduced to 24 lessons from the 50 lessons they had before.
The context of the Quran is elucidated by Hadith (the teachings, deeds and sayings of Muhammad). Of the 199 references to jihad in perhaps the most standard collection of hadith—Bukhari—all refer to warfare.
Quranists reject the hadith and follow the Quran only. The extent to which Quranists reject the authenticity of the Sunnah varies, but the more established groups have thoroughly criticised the authenticity of the hadith and refused it for many reasons, the most prevalent being the Quranist claim that hadith is not mentioned in the Quran as a source of Islamic theology and practice, was not recorded in written form until more than two centuries after the death of Muhammed, and contain perceived internal errors and contradictions.
According to Ahmadi Muslim belief, Jihad can be divided into three categories: Jihad al-Akbar (Greater Jihad) is that against the self and refers to striving against one's low desires such as anger, lust and hatred; Jihad al-Kabīr (Great Jihad) refers to the peaceful propagation of Islam, with special emphasis on spreading the true message of Islam by the pen; Jihad al-Asghar (Smaller Jihad) is only for self-defence under situations of extreme religious persecution whilst not being able to follow one's fundamental religious beliefs, and even then only under the direct instruction of the Caliph. Ahmadi Muslims point out that as per Islamic prophecy, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad rendered Jihad in its military form as inapplicable in the present age as Islam, as a religion, is not being attacked militarily but through literature and other media, and therefore the response should be likewise. They believe that the answer of hate should be given by love. Concerning terrorism, the fourth Caliph of the Community writes:
As far as Islam is concerned, it categorically rejects and condemns every form of terrorism. It does not provide any cover or justification for any act of violence, be it committed by an individual, a group or a government.
Ahmadi Muslims believe that no verse of the Quran abrogates or cancels another verse. All Quranic verses have equal validity, in keeping with their emphasis on the "unsurpassable beauty and unquestionable validity of the Qur'ān". The harmonization of apparently incompatible rulings is resolved through their juridical deflation in Ahmadī fiqh, so that a ruling (considered to have applicability only to the specific situation for which it was revealed), is effective not because it was revealed last, but because it is most suited to the situation at hand.
The Islamic criminal law is criminal law in accordance with Sharia. Strictly speaking, Islamic law does not have a distinct corpus of "criminal law." It divides crimes into three different categories depending on the offense – Hudud (crimes "against God", whose punishment is fixed in the Quran and the Hadiths); Qisas (crimes against an individual or family whose punishment is equal retaliation in the Quran and the Hadiths); and Tazir (crimes whose punishment is not specified in the Quran and the Hadiths, and is left to the discretion of the ruler or Qadi, i.e. judge). Some add the fourth category of Siyasah (crimes against government), while others consider it as part of either Hadd or Tazir crimes.
Hudud is an Islamic concept: punishments which under Islamic law (Shariah) are mandated and fixed by God. The Shariah divided offenses into those against God and those against man. Crimes against God violated His Hudud, or 'boundaries'. These punishments were specified by the Quran, and in some instances by the Sunnah. They are namely for adultery, fornication, homosexuality, illegal sex by a slave girl, accusing someone of illicit sex but failing to present four male Muslim eyewitnesses,apostasy, consuming intoxicants, outrage (e.g. rebellion against the lawful Caliph, other forms of mischief against the Muslim state, or highway robbery), robbery and theft. The crimes against hudud cannot be pardoned by the victim or by the state, and the punishments must be carried out in public.
These punishments range from public lashing to publicly stoning to death, amputation of hands and crucifixion. However, in most Muslim nations in modern times public stoning and execution are relatively uncommon, although they are found in Muslim nations that follow a strict interpretation of sharia, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran.
Qisas is an Islamic term meaning "retaliation in kind" or revenge, "eye for an eye", "nemesis" or retributive justice. It is a category of crimes in Islamic jurisprudence, where Sharia allows equal retaliation as the punishment. Qisas principle is available against the accused, to the victim or victim's heirs, when a Muslim is murdered, suffers bodily injury or suffers property damage. In the case of murder, Qisas means the right of a murder victim's nearest relative or Wali (legal guardian) to, if the court approves, take the life of the killer. The Quran mentions the "eye for an eye" concept as being ordained for the Children of Israel in Qur'an, 2:178: "O you who have believed, prescribed for you is legal retribution (Qasas) for those murdered – the free for the free, the slave for the slave, and the female for the female. But whoever overlooks from his brother anything, then there should be a suitable follow-up and payment to him with good conduct. This is an alleviation from your Lord and a mercy. But whoever transgresses after that will have a painful punishment." Shi'ite countries that use Islamic Sharia law, such as Iran, apply the "eye for an eye" rule literally.
In the Torah We prescribed for them a life for a life, an eye for an eye, a nose for a nose, an ear for an ear, a tooth for a tooth, an equal wound for a wound: if anyone forgoes this out of charity, it will serve as atonement for his bad deeds. Those who do not judge according to what God has revealed are doing grave wrong. (Qurʾān, 5:45)
Beheading was the normal method of executing the death penalty under classical Islamic law. It was also, together with hanging, one of the ordinary methods of execution in the Ottoman Empire.
Rajm (رجم) is an Arabic word that means "stoning". It is commonly used to refer to the Hudud punishment wherein an organized group throws stones at a convicted individual until that person dies. Under Islamic law, it is the prescribed punishment in cases of adultery committed by a married man or married woman. The conviction requires a confession from either the adulterer/adulteress, or the testimony of four witnesses (as prescribed by the Quran in Surah an-Nur verse 4), or pregnancy outside of marriage.
Blasphemy in Islam is impious utterance or action concerning God, Muhammad or anything considered sacred in Islam. The Quran admonishes blasphemy, but does not specify any worldly punishment for it. The hadiths, which are another source of Sharia, suggest various punishments for blasphemy, which may include death. There are a number of surah in Qur'an relating to blasphemy, from which Quranic verses 5:33 and 33:57–61 have been most commonly used in Islamic history to justify and punish blasphemers. Various fiqhs (schools of jurisprudence) of Islam have different punishment for blasphemy, depending on whether blasphemer is Muslim or non-Muslim, man or woman. The punishment can be fines, imprisonment, flogging, amputation, hanging, or beheading.
Penalties (actual or proposed) for apostasy in some Muslim-majority countries as of 2013.
Apostasy in Islam is commonly defined as the conscious abandonment of Islam by a Muslim in word or through deed. A majority considers apostasy in Islam to be some form of religious crime, although a minority does not.
The definition of apostasy from Islam and its appropriate punishment(s) are controversial, and they vary among Islamic scholars.Apostasy in Islam may include in its scope not only the renunciation of Islam by a Muslim and the joining of another religion or becoming non-religious, or questioning or denying any "fundamental tenet or creed" of Islam such as the divinity of God, prophethood of Muhammad, or mocking God, or worshipping one or more idols. The apostate (or murtadd مرتد) term has also been used for people of religions that trace their origins to Islam, such as the Bahá'ís in Iran, but who were never actually Muslims themselves. Apostasy in Islam does not include acts against Islam or conversion to another religion that is involuntary, due mental disorders, forced or done as concealment out of fear of persecution or during war (Taqiyya or Kitman).
Historically, the majority of Islamic scholars considered apostasy a hudud crime as well as a sin, an act of treason punishable with the death penalty, and the Islamic law on apostasy and the punishment one of the immutable laws under Islam. The punishment for apostasy includes state enforced annulment of his or her marriage, seizure of the person's children and property with automatic assignment to guardians and heirs, and a death penalty for apostates, typically after a waiting period to allow the apostate time to repent and return to Islam. Female apostates could be either executed, according to Shafi'i, Maliki, and Hanbali schools of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), or imprisoned until she reverts to Islam as advocated by the Sunni Hanafi school and by Shi'a scholars. The kind of apostasy generally deemed to be punishable by the jurists was of the political kind, although there were considerable legal differences of opinion on this matter. There where early Islamic scholars that did not agree with the death penalty and prescribed indefinite imprisonment until repentance. The Hanafi jurist Sarakhsi also called for different punishments between the non-seditious religious apostasy and that of seditious and political nature, or high treason. Some modern scholars also argue that the death penalty is an inappropriate punishment, inconsistent with the Quranic injunctions such as Quran 88:21–22 or "no compulsion in religion"; and/or that it is not a general rule but enacted at a time when the early Muslim community faced enemies who threatened its unity, safety, and security, and needed to prevent and punish the equivalent of desertion or treason, and should be enforced only if apostasy becomes a mechanism of public disobedience and disorder (fitna). According to Khalid Abu El Fadl, moderate Muslims reject such penalty.
To the Ahmadi Muslim sect, there is no punishment for apostasy, neither in the Qur'an nor as taught by the founder of Islam, Muhammad. This position of the Ahmadi sect is not widely accepted in other sects of Islam, and the Ahmadi sect acknowledges that major sects have a different interpretation and definition of apostasy in Islam.:18–25Ulama of major sects of Islam consider the Ahmadi Muslim sect as kafirs (infidels):8 and apostates.
Under current laws in Islamic countries, the actual punishment for the apostate ranges from execution to prison term to no punishment. Islamic nations with sharia courts use civil code to void the Muslim apostate's marriage and deny child custody rights, as well as his or her inheritance rights for apostasy. Twenty-three Muslim-majority countries, as of 2013, additionally covered apostasy in Islam through their criminal laws. Today, apostasy is a crime in 23 out 49 Muslim majority countries; in many other Muslim nations such as Indonesia and Morocco, apostasy is indirectly covered by other laws. It is subject in some countries, such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, to the death penalty, although executions for apostasy are rare. Apostasy is legal in secular Muslim countries such as Turkey. In numerous Islamic majority countries, many individuals have been arrested and punished for the crime of apostasy without any associated capital crimes. In a 2013 report based on an international survey of religious attitudes, more than 50% of the Muslim population in 6 Islamic countries supported the death penalty for any Muslim who leaves Islam (apostasy). A similar survey of the Muslim population in the United Kingdom, in 2007, found nearly a third of 16 to 24-year-old faithfuls believed that Muslims who convert to another religion should be executed, while less than a fifth of those over 55 believed the same.
According to Quran 24:4, the proof that adultery has occurred requires four eyewitnesses to the act, which must have been committed by a man and a woman not validly married to one another, and the act must have been wilfully committed by consenting adults. Proof can also be determined by a confession. But this confession must be voluntary, and based on legal counsel; it must be repeated on four separate occasions, and made by a person who is sane. Otherwise, the accuser is then accorded a sentence for defamation (which means flogging or a prison sentence), and his or her testimony is excluded in all future court cases. There is disagreement between Islamic scholars on whether female eyewitnesses are acceptable witnesses in cases of zina (for other crimes, sharia considers two female witnesses equal the witness of one male).
Zina is a Hudud crime, stated in multiple sahih hadiths to deserve the stoning (Rajm) punishment. In others stoning is prescribed as punishment for illegal sex between man and woman, In some sunnah, the method of stoning, by first digging a pit and partly burying the person's lower half in it, is described. Based on these hadiths, in some Muslim countries, married adulterers are sentenced to death, while consensual sex between unmarried people is sentenced with flogging a 100 times. Adultery can be punished by up to one hundred lashes, though this is not binding in nature and the final decision will always be in the hands of a judge appointed by the state or community. However, no mention of stoning or capital punishment for adultery is found in the Quran and only mentioning lashing as punishment for adultery. Nevertheless, most scholars maintain that there is sufficient evidence from hadiths to derive a ruling.
Sharia law makes a distinction between adultery and rape and applies different rules. In the case of rape, the adult male perpetrator (i.e. rapist) of such an act is to receive the ḥadd zinā, but the non-consenting or invalidly consenting female (i.e. rape victim), proved by four eyewitnesses, is to be regarded as innocent of zinā and relieved of the ḥadd punishment. Confession and four witness-based prosecutions of zina are rare. Most cases of prosecutions are when the woman becomes pregnant, or when she has been raped, seeks justice and the sharia authorities charge her for zina, instead of duly investigating the rapist. Some fiqhs (schools of Islamic jurisprudence) created the principle of shubha (doubt), wherein there would be no zina charges if a Muslim man claims he believed he was having sex with a woman he was married to or with a woman he owned as a slave.
Zina only applies for unlawful sex between free Muslims; the rape of a non-Muslim slave woman is not zina as the act is considered an offense not against the raped slave woman, but against the owner of the slave.
The zina and rape laws of countries under Sharia law are the subjects of a global human rights debate and one of many items of reform and secularization debate with respect to Islam. Contemporary human right activists refer this as a new phase in the politics of gender in Islam, the battle between forces of traditionalism and modernism in the Muslim world, and the use of religious texts of Islam through state laws to sanction and practice gender-based violence.
In contrast to human rights activists, Islamic scholars and Islamist political parties consider 'universal human rights' arguments as imposition of a non-Muslim culture on Muslim people, a disrespect of customary cultural practices and sexual codes that are central to Islam. Zina laws come under hudud—seen as crime against Allah; the Islamists refer to this pressure and proposals to reform zina and other laws as 'contrary to Islam'. Attempts by international human rights to reform religious laws and codes of Islam has become the Islamist rallying platforms during political campaigns.
The Quran contains seven references to fate of "the people of Lut", and their destruction is associated explicitly with their sexual practices:
Given that the Quran is allegedly vague regarding the punishment of homosexual sodomy, Islamic jurists, turned to the collections of the hadith and seerah (accounts of Muhammad's life) to support their argument for Hudud punishment. There were varying opinions on how the death penalty was to be carried out. Abu Bakr apparently recommended toppling a wall on the evil-doer, or else burning alive, while Ali bin Abi Talib ordered death by stoning for one "luti" and had another thrown head-first from the top of a minaret—according to Ibn Abbas, this last punishment must be followed by stoning. With few exceptions all scholars of Sharia, or Islamic law, interpret homosexual activity as a punishable offence as well as a sin. There is no specific punishment prescribed, however, and this is usually left to the discretion of the local authorities on Islam. There are several methods by which sharia jurists have advocated the punishment of gays or lesbians who are sexually active. One form of execution involves an individual convicted of homosexual acts being stoned to death by a crowd of Muslims. Other Muslim jurists have established ijma ruling that those committing homosexual acts be thrown from rooftops or high places, and this is the perspective of most Salafists.
While some authors, such as Phyllis Chesler, argue that Islam is connected to violence against women, especially in the form of honor killings, others, such as Tahira Shahid Khan, a professor specializing in women's issues at the Aga Khan University in Pakistan, argue that it is the domination of men and inferior status of women in society that lead to these acts, not the religion itself. Public (such as through the media) and political discourse debating the relation between Islam, immigration, and violence against women is highly controversial in many Western countries.
Many scholars claim Shari'a law encourages domestic violence against women, when a husband suspects nushuz (disobedience, disloyalty, rebellion, ill conduct) in his wife. Other scholars claim wife beating, for nashizah, is not consistent with modern perspectives of Qur'an. Some conservative translations find that Muslim husbands are permitted to act what is known in Arabic as Idribuhunna with the use of "light force," and sometimes as much as to strike, hit, chastise, or beat.[a] Contemporary Egyptian scholar Abd al-Halim Abu Shaqqa refers to the opinions of jurists Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani, a medieval Shafiite Sunni scholar of Islam who represents the entire realm of Shaykh al Islam, and al-Shawkani, a YemeniSalafi scholar of Islam, jurist and reformer, who state that hitting should only occur in extraordinary cases. Some Islamic scholars and commentators have emphasized that hitting, even where permitted, is not to be harsh.[b]
Other interpretations of the verse claim it does not support hitting a woman, but separating from her. Variations in interpretation are due to different schools of Islamic jurisprudence, histories and politics of religious institutions, conversions, reforms, and education.
Although Islam permits women to divorce for domestic violence, they are subject to the laws of their nation which might make it quite difficult for a woman to obtain a divorce. In deference to Surah 4:34, many nations with Shari'a law have refused to consider or prosecute cases of domestic abuse.
Islamic terrorism is, by definition, terrorist acts committed by Muslim groups or individuals who profess Islamic or Islamist motivations or goals. Islamic terrorists have relied on particular interpretations of the tenets of the Quran and the Hadith, citing these scriptures to justify violent tactics including mass murder, genocide, child-molestation and slavery. In recent decades, incidents of Islamic terrorism have occurred on a global scale, occurring not only in Muslim-majority states in Africa and Asia, but also abroad in Europe, Russia, and the United States, and such attacks have targeted Muslims and non-Muslims. In a number of the worst-affected Muslim-majority regions, these terrorists have been met by armed, independent resistance groups, state actors and their proxies, and politically liberal Muslim protesters.
Peace is an important aspect of Islam, and Muslims are encouraged to strive for peace and peaceful solutions to all problems. However, most Muslims are generally not pacifists, as the teachings in the Qur'an and Hadith allow for wars to be fought if they can be justified. According to James Turner Johnson, there is no normative tradition of pacifism in Islam.
Prior to the Hijra travel, Muhammad struggled non-violently against his opposition in Mecca. It was not until after the exile that the Quranic revelations began to adopt a more violent perspective. Fighting in self-defense is not only legitimate but considered obligatory upon Muslims, according to the Qur'an. The Qur'an, however, says that should the enemy's hostile behavior cease, then the reason for engaging the enemy also lapses.
Statistical academic studies have found that violent crime is less common among Muslim populations than among non-Muslim populations. The average homicide rate in the Muslim world was 2.4 per 100,000, less than a third of non-Muslim countries which had an average homicide rate of 7.5 per 100,000. The average homicide rate among the 19 most populous Muslim countries was 2.1 per 100,000, less than a fifth of the average homicide rate among the 19 most populous Christian countries which was 11.0 per 100,000, including 5.6 per 100,000 in the United States. A negative correlation was found between a country's homicide rate and its percentage of Muslims, in contrast to a positive correlation found between a country's homicide rate and its percentage of Christians. According to Professor Steven Fish: "The percentage of the society that is made up of Muslims is an extraordinarily good predictor of a country’s murder rate. More authoritarianism in Muslim countries does not account for the difference. I have found that controlling for political regime in statistical analysis does not change the findings. More Muslims, less homicide." Professor Jerome L. Neapolitan compared low crime rates in Islamic countries to low crime in Japan, comparing the role of Islam to that of Japan's Shinto and Buddhist traditions in fostering cultures emphasizing the importance of community and social obligation, contributing to less criminal behaviour than other nations.
A statistical textual analysis of the Qur'an and Bible conducted by software engineer Tom Anderson in 2016, using the Odin Text analytics software, found that violence is less frequent in the Qur'an than in the Bible. According to Anderson: "Killing and destruction are referenced slightly more often in the New Testament (2.8%) than in the Quran (2.1%), but the Old Testament clearly leads—more than twice that of the Quran—in mentions of destruction and killing (5.3%)."
Gallup and Pew polls
Polls have found Muslim-Americans to report less violent views than any other religious group in America. 89% of Muslim-Americans claimed that the killing of civilians is never justified, compared to 71% of Catholics and Protestants, 75% of Jews, and 76% of atheists and non-religious groups. When Gallup asked if it is justifiable for the military to kill civilians, the percentage of people who said it is sometimes justifiable were 21% among Muslims, 58% among Protestants and Catholics, 52% among Jews, and 43% among atheists. Gallup in 2008 found that Palestinians held generally less violent views than Israelis, with up to 14% of Palestinians and up to 52% of Israelis saying it is sometimes justifiable to kill civilians.
Counter-terrorism researchers suggests that support for suicide bombings is rooted in opposition to real or perceived foreign military occupation, rather than Islam, according to a Department of Defense-funded study by University of Chicago researcher Robert Pape. The Pew Research Center also found that support for the death penalty as punishment for "people who leave the Muslim religion" was 86% in Jordan, 84% in Egypt, 76% in Pakistan, 51% in Nigeria, 30% in Indonesia, 6% in Lebanon and 5% in Turkey. The different factors at play (e.g. sectarianism, poverty, etc.) and their relative impacts are not clarified.
The Pew Research Center's 2013 poll showed that the majority of 14,244 Muslim, Christian and other respondents in 14 countries with substantial Muslim populations are concerned about Islamic extremism and hold negative views on known terrorist groups.
Gallup poll collected extensive data in a project called "Who Speaks for Islam?". John Esposito and Dalia Mogahed present data relevant to Islamic views on peace, and more, in their book Who Speaks for Islam? The book reports Gallup poll data from random samples in over 35 countries using Gallup's various research techniques (e.g. pairing male and female interviewers, testing the questions beforehand, communicating with local leaders when approval is necessary, travelling by foot if that is the only way to reach a region, etc.)
There was a great deal of data. It suggests, firstly, that individuals who dislike America and consider the September 11 attacks to be "perfectly justified" form a statistically distinct group, with much more extreme views. The authors call this 7% of Muslims "Politically Radicalized". They chose that title "because of their radical political orientation" and clarify "we are not saying that all in this group commit acts of violence. However, those with extremist views are a potential source for recruitment or support for terrorist groups." The data also indicates that poverty is not simply to blame for the comparatively radical views of this 7% of Muslims, who tend to be better educated than moderates.
The authors say that, contrary to what the media may indicate, most Muslims believe that the September 11 attacks cannot actually be justified at all. The authors called this 55% of Muslims "Moderates". Included in that category were an additional 12% who said the attacks almost cannot be justified at all (thus 67% of Muslims were classified as Moderates). 26% of Muslims were neither moderates nor radicals, leaving the remaining 7% called "Politically Radicalized". Esposito and Mogahed explain that the labels should not be taken as being perfectly definitive. Because there may be individuals who would generally not be considered radical, although they believe the attacks were justified, or vice versa.
Perception of Islam
Philip W. Sutton and Stephen Vertigans describe Western views on Islam as based on a stereotype of it as an inherently violent religion, characterizing it as a 'religion of the sword'. They characterize the image of Islam in the Western world as "dominated by conflict, aggression, 'fundamentalism', and global-scale violent terrorism."
Juan Eduardo Campo writes that, "Europeans (have) viewed Islam in various ways: sometimes as a backward, violent religion; sometimes as an Arabian Nights fantasy; and sometimes as a complex and changing product of history and social life." Robert Gleave writes that, "at the centre of popular conceptions of Islam as a violent religion are the punishments carried out by regimes hoping to bolster both their domestic and international Islamic credentials."
Media coverage on terrorist attacks play a critical role in creating negative perceptions on Islam and Muslims. Powell  described how Islam initially appeared in U.S. news cycles because of its relationships to oil, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and terrorism (92). Thus the audience was provided the base to associate Muslims to control of the resource of oil, war, and terrorism. A total of 11 terrorist attacks in the U.S. soil since the 9/11 and their content coverage (in 1,638 news stories) in the national media had been analyzed "through frames composed of labels, common themes, and rhetorical associations" (Powell 94). The key findings are summarized below:
The media coverage of terrorism in the U.S. feeds a culture of fear of Islam and describes the United States as a good Christian nation (Powell 105).
A clear pattern of reporting had been detected that differentiates "terrorists who were Muslim with international ties and terrorists who were U.S. citizens with no clear international ties" (Powell 105). This was utilized to frame "war of Islam on the United States".
"Muslim Americans are no longer ‘'free'’ to practice and to name their religion without fear of prosecution, judgment, or connection to terrorism." (Powell 107)
Islamophobia denotes the prejudice against, hatred towards, or fear of the religion of Islam or Muslims. While the term is now widely used, both the term itself and the underlying concept of Islamophobia have been heavily criticized. In order to differentiate between prejudiced views of Islam and secularly motivated criticism of Islam other terms have been proposed. The causes and characteristics of Islamophobia are still debated. Some commentators have posited an increase in Islamophobia resulting from the September 11 attacks, while others have associated it with the increased presence of Muslims in the United States, the European Union and other secular nations. Steven Salaita contends that indeed since 9/11, Arab Americans have evolved from what Nadine Naber described as an invisible group in the United States into a highly visible community that directly or indirectly has an effect on the United States' culture wars, foreign policy, presidential elections and legislative tradition.
In response to these perceptions, Ram Puniyani, a secular activist and writer, says that "Islam does not condone violence but, like other religions, does believe in self-defence".
Mark Juergensmeyer describes the teachings of Islam as ambiguous about violence. He states that, like all religions, Islam occasionally allows for force while stressing that the main spiritual goal is one of nonviolence and peace.Ralph W. Hood, Peter C. Hill and Bernard Spilka write in The Psychology of Religion: An Empirical Approach, "Although it would be a mistake to think that Islam is inherently a violent religion, it would be equally inappropriate to fail to understand the conditions under which believers might feel justified in acting violently against those whom their tradition feels should be opposed."
Similarly, Chandra Muzaffar, a political scientist, Islamic reformist and activist, says, "The Quranic exposition on resisting aggression, oppression and injustice lays down the parameters within which fighting or the use of violence is legitimate. What this means is that one can use the Quran as the criterion for when violence is legitimate and when it is not."
^Abdullah Yusuf Ali in his Quranic commentary states that: "In case of family jars four steps are mentioned, to be taken in that order. (1) Perhaps verbal advice or admonition may be sufficient; (2) if not, sex relations may be suspended; (3) if this is not sufficient, some slight physical correction may be administered; but Imam Shafi'i considers this inadvisable, though permissible, and all authorities are unanimous in deprecating any sort of cruelty, even of the nagging kind, as mentioned in the next clause; (4) if all this fails, a family council is recommended in passage 4:35."
^Ibn Kathir Ad-Damishqee records in his Tafsir Al-Qur'an Al-Azim that "Ibn 'Abbas and several others said that the Ayah refers to a beating that is not violent. Al-Hasan Al-Basri said that it means, a beating that is not severe."
^Staff (3 January 2003). "Analysis: Nigeria's Sharia Split". BBC News. Retrieved 19 September 2011. "Thousands of people have been killed in fighting between Christians and Muslims following the introduction of sharia punishments in northern Nigerian states over the past three years".
Harnischfeger, Johannes (2008). • p. 16. "When the Governor of Kaduna announced the introduction of Sharia, although non-Muslims form almost half of the population, violence erupted, leaving more than 1,000 people dead." • p. 189. "When a violent confrontation loomed in February 200, because the strong Christian minority in Kaduna was unwilling to accept the proposed sharia law, the sultan and his delegation of 18 emirs went to see the governor and insisted on the passage of the bill."
^. Library of Congress Country Studies: Sudan:. "The factors that provoked the military coup, primarily the closely intertwined issues of Islamic law and of the civil war in the south, remained unresolved in 1991. The September 1983 implementation of the sharia throughout the country had been controversial and provoked widespread resistance in the predominantly non-Muslim south ... Opposition to the sharia, especially to the application of hudud (sing., hadd), or Islamic penalties, such as the public amputation of hands for theft, was not confined to the south and had been a principal factor leading to the popular uprising of April 1985 that overthrew the government of Jaafar an Nimeiri".
Marchal, R. (2013), Islamic political dynamics in the Somali civil war. Islam in Africa South of the Sahara: Essays in Gender Relations and Political Reform, pp. 331–52
Tibi, Bassam (2008). Political Islam, World Politics and Europe. Routledge. p. 33. "The shari'a was imposed on non-Muslim Sudanese peoples in September 1983, and since that time Muslims in the north have been fighting a jihad against the non-Muslims in the south."
^Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, "Islamic Foundations of Religious Human Rights", in Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective: Religious Perspectives, pp 351–56 (John Witte Jr. & Johan D. van der Vyver eds., 1996).
^ abHajjar, Lisa. "Religion, state power, and domestic violence in Muslim societies: A framework for comparative analysis." Law & Social Inquiry 29.1 (2004); pp. 1–38
^Al-Suwaidi, J. (1995). "Arab and western conceptions of democracy"; in Democracy, war, and peace in the Middle East (Editors: David Garnham, Mark A. Tessler), Indiana University Press, see Chapters 5 and 6; ISBN978-0253209399
^Al-Dawoody, Ahmed (15 February 2011). The Islamic Law of War: Justifications and Regulations. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 56. ISBN978-0-230-31994-3. Seventeen derivatives of jihād occur altogether forty-one times in eleven Meccan texts and thirty Medinan ones, with the following five meanings: striving because of religious belief (21), war (12), non-Muslim parents exerting pressure, that is, jihād, to make their children abandon Islam (2), solemn oaths (5), and physical strength (1)
^Khaled Abou El Fadl stresses that the Islamic theological tradition did not have a notion of "Holy war" (in Arabic al-harb al-muqaddasa), which is not an expression used by the Quranic text or Muslim theologians. In Islamic theology, war is never holy; it is either justified or not. He further states that the Quran does not use the word jihad to refer to warfare or fighting; such acts are referred to as qital. (source:Abou El Fadl, Khaled (23 January 2007). The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists. HarperOne. p. 222. ISBN978-0061189036.
^Bernard Lewis, The Political Language of Islam (University of Chicago Press, 1988), p. 72. Cf. William M. Watt, Islamic Conceptions of the Holy War in: Thomas P. Murphy, The Holy War (Ohio State University Press, 1974), p. 143
^Berkey, Jonathan Porter (2003). The Formation of Islam: Religion and Society in the Near East, 600–1800. Cambridge University Press. p. 73. ISBN978-0-521-58813-3. The Koran is not a squeamish document, and exhort the believers to jihad. Verses such as "Do not follow the unbelievers, but struggle against them mightily" (25.52) and "fight [those who have been given a revelation] who do not believe in God and the last day" (9.29) may originally have been directed against Muhammad's local enemies, the pagans of Mecca or the Jews of Medina, but could be redirected once a new set of enemies appeared.
^William M. Watt: Muhammad at Medina, p. 4; q.v. the Tafsir regarding these verses
^David Cook, Understanding Jihad; University of California Press: CA, 2005
^Magaard, Tina (2007). "Fjendebilleder og voldsforestillinger i islamiske grundtekster [Images of enemies and conceptions of violence in Islamic core scriptures]". In Mehdi Mozaffari; Hans-Jørgen Schanz; Mikkel Thorup (eds.). Totalitarisme: venskab og fjendskab (in Danish). Århus Universitetsforlag. pp. 213–238.
^ abKohlberg, Etan, "The Development of the Imami Shi'i Doctrine of Jihad." Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgen Laendischen Gesellschaft, 126 (1976), pp. 64–86, esp. pp. 78–86
^Streusand, Douglas E. (September 1997). "What Does Jihad Mean?". Middle East Quarterly: 9–17. Shi'i writers make a further qualification, that offensive jihad is permissible only in the presence of the expected Imam-and thus not under current circumstances.
^Khaleel Muhammad, professor of religious studies at San Diego State University, states, regarding his discussion with the critic Robert Spencer, that "when I am told ... that Jihad only means war, or that I have to accept interpretations of the Qur'an that non-Muslims (with no good intentions or knowledge of Islam) seek to force upon me, I see a certain agendum developing: one that is based on hate, and I refuse to be part of such an intellectual crime." "Archived copy". Archived from the original on 8 July 2008. Retrieved 13 October 2008.CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link)
^Ishay, Micheline (2 June 2008). The history of human rights. Berkeley: University of California. p. 45. ISBN978-0-520-25641-5.
^Article on Jihad by Dr. G. W. Leitner (founder of The Oriental Institute, UK) published in Asiatic Quarterly Review, 1886. ("Jihad, even when explained as a righteous effort of waging war in self defense against the grossest outrage on one's religion, is strictly limited..")
^Muhammad ibn Isma'il Bukhari, The Translation of the Meaning of Sahih al-Bukhari, trans. Muhammad Muhsin Khan, 8 vols. (Medina: Dar al-Fikr: 1981), 4:34–204. Quoted in Streusand, Douglas E. (September 1997). "What Does Jihad Mean?". Middle East Quarterly: 9–17. In hadith collections, jihad means armed action; for example, the 199 references to jihad in the most standard collection of hadith, Sahih al-Bukhari, all assume that jihad means warfare.
^Sadr-u-Din, Maulvi. "Quran and War", p. 8. Published by The Muslim Book Society, Lahore, Pakistan.
^The Quranic Commandments Regarding War/Jihad An English rendering of an Urdu article appearing in Basharat-e-Ahmadiyya Vol. I, pp. 228–32, by Dr. Basharat Ahmad; published by the Lahore Ahmadiyya Movement for the Propagation of Islam
^Ali, Maulana Muhammad. The Religion of Islam (6th Edition), Ch V "Jihad". pp. 411–13. Published by The Lahore Ahmadiyya Movement. link
^Wiederhold, Lutz. "Blasphemy against the Prophet Muhammad and his companions (sabb al-rasul, sabb al-sahabah): The introduction of the topic into shafi'i legal literature and its relevance for legal practice under Mamluk rule."Journal of semitic studies 42.1 (1997): 39–70.
^Brian Winston (2014), The Rushdie Fatwa and After: A Lesson to the Circumspect, Palgrave Macmillan, ISBN978-1137388599, pp. 74, Quote – "(In the case of blasphemy and Salman Rushdie) the death sentence it pronounced was grounded in a jurisprudential gloss on the Surah al-Ahzab (33:57)"
^P Smith (2003), Speak No Evil: Apostasy, Blasphemy and Heresy in Malaysian Syariah Law, UC Davis Journal Int'l Law & Policy, 10, pp. 357–373; *N Swazo (2014), The Case of Hamza Kashgari: Examining Apostasy, Heresy, And Blasphemy Under Sharia, The Review of Faith & International Affairs, 12(4), pp. 16–26
^Frank Griffel, Apostasy, in (Editor: Gerhard Bowering et al.) The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought, ISBN978-0691134840, pp 40–41; Diane Morgan (2009), Essential Islam: A Comprehensive Guide to Belief and Practice, ISBN978-0313360251, pages 182–183
^Hebatallah Ghali (2006), Rights of Muslim Converts to Christianity PhD Thesis, Department of Law, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, The American University in Cairo, Egypt, page 2; "Whereas apostate (murtad) is the person who commits apostasy ('rtidad), that is the conscious abandonment of allegiance, and renunciation of a religious faith or abandonment of a previous loyalty".
^Sudan woman faces death for apostasy BBC News (15 May 2014); Quote "There is a long-running debate in Islam over whether apostasy is a crime. Some liberal scholars hold the view that it is not (...), Others say apostasy is (...). The latter is the dominant view (...)."
^Peters & De Vries (1976), Apostasy in Islam, Die Welt des Islams, Vol. 17, Issue 1/4, pp 16
^Peters & De Vries (1976), Apostasy in Islam, Die Welt des Islams, Vol. 17, Issue 1/4, p. 3, quote – "By the murtadd or apostate is understood as the Moslem by birth or by conversion, who renounces his religion, irrespective of whether or not he subsequently embraces another faith".
^Peters & De Vries (1976), Apostasy in Islam, Die Welt des Islams, Vol. 17, Issue 1/4, pp. 3–4
^Nuh Ha Mim Keller (1997), Umdat as-Salik by Ahmad ibn Naqib al-Misri, Reliance of the Traveller: A Classic Manual of Islamic Sacred Law, ISBN978-0915957729, pp. 596–598, Section O-8.7
^R. Ibrahim (2009, editors: J. Gallagher and E. Patterson), Debating the War of Ideas, Palgrave Macmillan, ISBN978-0-23061-9364, p. 68-72, quote – "Muslims who were forced to choose between recanting Islam or suffering persecution were, and still are, permitted to lie by feigning apostasy" (p. 68).
^Ahmet Albayrak writes in The Qur'an: An Encyclopedia that regarding apostasy as a wrongdoing is not a sign of intolerance of other religions, and is not aimed at one’s freedom to choose a religion or to leave Islam and embrace another faith, but that on the contrary, it is more correct to say that the punishment is enforced as a safety precaution when warranted if apostasy becomes a mechanism of public disobedience and disorder (fitna). Oliver Leaman, The Qur'an: An Encyclopedia, pp. 526–527.
Ali, Kecia (2010). Marriage and slavery in early Islam. US: Harvard University Press. pp. 161–72.;
Haeri, Shahla (1989). Law of Desire: Temporary Marriage in Shi'i Iran. Syracuse University Press. pp. 24–32. ISBN978-0815624837. Quote: Sexual intercourse with one's own slave girl continued to be legitimate until recently in most Islamic societies. Slave ownership should not be confused with slave marriage. Slave marriage involves marriage of a slave with another person, with the permission of the slave master. Marriage is not necessary between a male slave owner and his female slaves. His ownership entitles him to a right of intercourse.
^LAU, M. (2007), Twenty-Five Years of Hudood Ordinances: A Review, Washington and Lee Law Review, n. 64, pp. 1291–314
^Rehman J. (2007), The sharia, Islamic family laws and international human rights law: Examining the theory and practice of polygamy and talaq, International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family, 21(1), pp. 108–27
^KAMALI (1998), Punishment in Islamic Law: A Critique of the Hudud Bill of Kelantan Malaysia, Arab Law Quarterly, vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 203–34
^QURAISHI, A (1996), Her Honor: An Islamic Critique of the Rape Laws of Pakistan from a Woman-Sensitive Perspective, Michigan Journal of International Law, vol. 18, pp. 287–320
^A. SAJOO (1999), Islam and Human Rights: Congruence or Dichotomy, Temple International and Comparative Law Journal, vol. 4, pp. 23–34
^K. ALI (2003), Progressive Muslims and Islamic Jurisprudence: The Necessity for Critical Engagement with Marriage and Divorce Law, In: SAFI, O. (Ed.). Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gender, and Pluralism, Oxford: Oneworld, pp. 163–89
^Sutton, Philip W.; Vertigans, Stephen (2005). Resurgent Islam: a sociological approach. Polity. p. 7. ISBN9780745632339. Stereotypical views which portray Islam as an inherently violent religion, a 'religion of the sword' and an increasing global threat have thus been reinforced and even extended over recent years.
^Campo, Juan Eduardo (2009). Encyclopedia of Islam. Infobase Publishing. p. 374.