اخلاق هنجاری (Normative Ethics) شاخهای از فلسفه اخلاق است که به پرسشهایی از قبیل "فرد چگونه باید از لحاظ اخلاقی عمل کند؟" میپردازد. اخلاق هنجاری با فرااخلاق تفاوت دارد، زیرا معیارهای درستی و غلط بودن عمل را بررسی میکند، درحالیکه فرااخلاق به مطالعه مفهوم زبان اخلاقی و متافیزیک حقایق اخلاقی میپردازد.
اخلاق هنجاری با اخلاق توصیفی نیز تفاوت دارد، زیرا اخلاق توصیفی به تحقیق تجربی بر روی عقاید اخلاقی مردم میپردازد. به بیان دیگر اخلاق توصیفی نشان میدهد چند درصد مردم عقیده دارند کشتن همیشه اشتباه است، درحالیکه اخلاق هنجاری به این میپردازد که آیا داشتن این باور درست یا غلط است. از این لحاظ، اخلاق هنجاری گاهی تجویزی خوانده میشود تا توصیفی. هرچند در برخی دیدگاههای فرااخلاقی مثل واقعگرایی اخلاقی، حقایق اخلاقی در حال واحد تجویزی و توصیفی هستند.
Normative ethics is distinct from meta-ethics because it examines standards for the rightness and wrongness of actions, while meta-ethics studies the meaning of moral language and the metaphysics of moral facts; and it is distinct from applied ethics in that the former is more concerned with 'who ought one be' rather than the ethics of a specific issue (such as if, or when, abortion is acceptable).
Normative ethics is also distinct from descriptive ethics, as the latter is an empirical investigation of people’s moral beliefs. In this context normative ethics is sometimes called prescriptive, rather than descriptive ethics. However, on certain versions of the meta-ethical view called moral realism, moral facts are both descriptive and prescriptive at the same time.
Most traditional moral theories rest on principles that determine whether an action is right or wrong. Classical theories in this vein include utilitarianism, Kantianism, and some forms of contractarianism. These theories mainly offered the use of overarching moral principles to resolve difficult moral decisions.
Normative ethical theories
There are disagreements about what precisely gives an action, rule, or disposition its ethical force. There are three competing views on how moral questions should be answered, along with hybrid positions that combine some elements of each. Virtue ethics focuses on the character of those who are acting, while both deontological ethics and consequentialism focus on the status of the action, rule, or disposition itself. The latter two conceptions of ethics themselves come in various forms.
It can be unclear what it means to say that a person "ought to do X because it is moral, whether they like it or not". Morality is sometimes presumed to have some kind of special binding force on behaviour, but some philosophers think that, used this way, the word "ought" seems to wrongly attribute magic powers to morality. For instance, G. E. M. Anscombe worries that "ought" has become "a word of mere mesmeric force". British ethicist Philippa Foot elaborates that morality does not seem to have any special binding force, and she clarifies that people only behave morally when motivated by other factors.
If he is an amoral man he may deny that he has any reason to trouble his head over this or any other moral demand. Of course, he may be mistaken, and his life as well as others' lives may be most sadly spoiled by his selfishness. But this is not what is urged by those who think they can close the matter by an emphatic use of 'ought'. My argument is that they are relying on an illusion, as if trying to give the moral 'ought' a magic force.
Foot says "People talk, for instance, about the 'binding force' of morality, but it is not clear what this means if not that we feel ourselves unable to escape." The idea is that, faced with an opportunity to steal a book because we can get away with it, moral obligation itself has no power to stop us unless we feel an obligation. Morality may therefore have no binding force beyond regular human motivations, and people must be motivated to behave morally. The question then arises: what role does reason play in motivating moral behaviour?
The categorical imperative perspective suggests that proper reason always leads to particular moral behaviour. As mentioned above, Foot instead believes that humans are actually motivated by desires. Proper reason, on this view, allows humans to discover actions that get them what they want (i.e., hypothetical imperatives)—not necessarily actions that are moral.
Social structure and motivation can make morality binding in a sense, but only because it makes moral norms feel inescapable, according to Foot. John Stuart Mill adds that external pressures, to please others for instance, also influence this felt binding force, which he calls human "conscience". Mill says that humans must first reason about what is moral, then try to bring the feelings of our conscience in line with our reason. At the same time, Mill says that a good moral system (in his case, utilitarianism) ultimately appeals to aspects of human nature — which, must themselves be nurtured during upbringing. Mill explains:
Mill thus believes that it is important to appreciate that it is feelings that drive moral behavior, but also that they may not be present in some people (e.g. psychopaths). Mill goes on to describe factors that help ensure people develop a conscience and behave morally, and thinkers like Joseph Daleiden describe how societies can use science to figure out how to make people more likely to be good.